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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Admiralty-Limitations Period Where Jones Act and.
Unseaworthiness Counts joined
In a recent assertion 1 of the supremacy of federal maritime law the
Supreme Court of the United States took a new look at a thoroughly
settled doctrine2 and had relatively little difficulty deciding that insofar
as that doctrine allowed a state procedural limitation to impinge upon a
federally created right it could not be applied.
Briefly, the question before the Court was whether or not a state
court can apply a two-year state personal injury statute of limitations as
a bar to an action based on unseaworthiness that is joined with an action
for negligence under the Jones Act.8
Petitioner was a crew member on respondent's vessel. He was injured in a shipboard fall allegedly caused by the unseaworthy condition of
the vessel. Almost three years after the accident occurred he brought suit
in a Texas court, claiming damages under the Jones Act for negligence
and under the general maritime law for unseaworthiness and for maintenance and cure. The trial court found for the petitioner only on the maintenance and cure count. The intermediate appellate court affirmed, 4 refusing to review any assignments of error regarding the unseaworthiness
count, since in its opinion that count was barred by the two year state
statute of limitations.5 The Jones Act claim was not appealed. The
Texas Supreme Court denied petitioner's application for a writ of error.
The U.S. Supreme Court in "view of the importance of this ruling for
maritime personal injury litigation in the state courts" granted certiorari. 6
McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958).

-Lex fori.

Merchant Marine Act, 1920 (Jones Act), 41 STAT. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958).
In keeping with its traditional flexibility in granting relief, admiralty courts have applied the doctrine of laches-absent any limiting statute-in determining the timeliness of the bringing of claims. The early decisions were made with reference to the
"particular equitable circumstances of the case," see The Key City, 81 U.S. (14
Wall.) 653 (1871), and indeed, still are today, see, Gardner v. Panama R. Co.,
342 U.S. 29, 30 (1951).
However, even though generally no definite time is
adopted, the usual practice today is to follow by analogy the applicable state
statute of limitations and to bar the claim if the statute has run, unless the
libellant can show that his delay is excusable and there has been no prejudice to
the defendant. See Redman v. United States, 176 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1949).
'McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 290 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
TEx. Civ. STAT. art. 5526 § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1959). The maintenance and
T
cure count was not barred. This, probably because that action is considered
contractual in nature and therefore subject (by analogy) to the state statute of
limitations applicable to contract actions. Claussen v. Mene Grande Oil Co., 163
F. Supp. 779 (D. Del. 1958).
" McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 352 U.S. 1000 (1956).
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Upon review the judgment was vacated and the cause remanded (three
justices dissenting).
The Chief Justice, speaking for the majority, assumed this position:
the question of whether the state statute should be applied in this action
"must be determined with an eye to the practicalities of admiralty
personal injury litigation."' 7 Under the holding of Baltimore S.S. Co. v.
Phillips,8 ViZ., that unseaworthiness and Jones Act negligence are but
two aspects of a single cause of action so that a judgment on one is
res judicata as to the other, it became necessary for the injured seaman to
bring these two actions jointly.9 Congress gave the seaman a full three
years in which to prosecute his Jones Act claim, 10 but has remained silent
as to the unseaworthiness action. But if a state applies a shorter period
than three years to the unseaworthiness action it means that a seaman
can join the two actions only during the shorter period. This, according
to the Chief Justice, effects a limitation on the Jones Act right; a seaman
is not getting "full benefit" of the maritime law if he is compelled of
practical necessity to prosecute a claim within a shorter period than
Congress has allotted him.'1 Since the Texas statute produced this
effect it was held not to apply.
Justice Whittaker, dissenting, argued: (1) that the Jones Act and
unseaworthiness rights of action are separate and distinct; (2) the state
court is "bound to" apply the statute of limitations of its own state; (3)
that since the majority holding is confined to those cases where the two
actions are joined, the state statute will continue to apply where an
unseaworthiness action is brought alone, thereby producing inconsistencies in the application of limitations periods.
Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion, denied that the majority
intended to apply the three year limitation only where the Jones Act
and unseaworthiness actions were brought concurrently. He concluded
that, in order to avoid a course that would be "disruptive of the desired
uniformity of enforcement of maritime rights," the "three-year limitation
on the Jones Act remedy . . .is the ready and logical source to draw
7357 U.S. at 224.

8274 U.S. 316 (1927).
' Not within the scope of this note, but worth mentioning, is that the long bothersome rule-gleaned from the "at his election" clause of the Jones Act-requiring
election between the two "inconsistent" remedies of unseaworthiness and the Jones
Act, Pacific S. S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1938), is laid quietly at rest in the
principal case by a footnote, 357 U.S. at 222, n. 2. Actually, the Court's action is
little more than a post mortem "rest in peace" to a doctrine hamstrung by the
circuit courts almost a decade ago. See McCarthy v. American Eastern Corp.,

175 F.2d 724 (3d Cir. 1949).

"0See 357 U.S. at 225, n. 6.
" Evidently, the "full benefit" doctrine, as used here by the Chief Justice, must
mean that a seaman is not getting everything he should out of his Jones Act
claim if (1) he is not allowed to join an unseaworthiness count with it (2) at any
time during a full three years. See discussion of humanitarian doctrine in text
following note 36 infra.
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the period within which this federal
upon [by analogy] for determining
2
right may be enforced."'
So went the court. The holding, standing by itself, is clear enough;
but whether the broad intendment of Justice Brennan can be read into
it is a question of great importance to prospective litigants, who will no
doubt be more than curious to know what limitations-by analogy or
otherwise-will likely be applied to their claim. An analysis of the
objections urged by the dissent may yield some clue, something better
than a guess, as to whether the majority opinion should be sweepingly
or narrowly construed.
I
One of the principal objections to the majority holding is that it is
violative of the choice-of-law doctrine which here would require that
whenever an unseaworthiness action is being prosecuted, the local statute
of limitations governing personal injury actions be applied whether
the forum be state or federal. But this doctrine merely allows the interests of the state to be interpolated into the litigation of federally created
3
rights wherever the Congress and the judiciary have remained silent.'
Local interests become secondary however, when such supplementation
places a burden on the free exercise of such rights. Unfortunately, there
exists no hard and fast rule which indicates when that burden becomes
oppressive, but the broad precepts of supremacy and uniformity of the
federal maritime law have provided a potent one-two combination used
consistent results, by the Court in resolving
invariably, if not with
14
conflicts.
federal-state
A brief survey of the conflicts decisions reveals that little encroachment by the states on the maritime law has been allowed. The supremacy doctrine was used initially to declare that a state could not
15
Subsequently
extend its workmen's compensation act to cover seamen.
it has been employed to hold: (1) that a seaman cannot have recourse
against his employer through a common law negligence action;16 (2)
that a state Statute of Frauds cannot prevent the enforcement of an oral
230.
":357 U.S. 229,
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946).
See Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 245 (1942). But see Wilburn

1

21

Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955).
(1917). Justice McReynolds
1 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205
set forth in broad terms the supremacy rule: "[No state] legislation is valid if it
contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress, or works material
prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law, or interferes
with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and
interstate relations." Id. at 216.
The court, following
1 Chelentis v. Luchenback S. S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
the Jensen case, supra note 15, held that such an action was not a "right" known to
the maritime law, nor a "remedy" within the "saving to suitors" clause of the
Judiciary Act of 1789.
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maritime contract;17 (3) that a state burden-of-proof rule regarding
releases must yield to a contrary maritime rule ;18 (4) that a strict state
rule regarding the relation back of pleadings amendments must yield
to a more flexible admiralty rule (even though an admiralty court is
enforcing a state-created right) ;19 and (5) that a state court cannot
apply the common law contributory negligence doctrine to bar a seaman's
20
claim, but must apply instead the maritime comparative negligence rule.
On the other hand the court has held that actions brought in
admiralty under state wrongful death acts are subject to defences avail21
able under the laws of the state whose statute gives the right of action.
Likewise, a state statute providing for the survival of a cause of action
22
against a deceased maritime tortfeasor was found to be permissible.
And recently the court, finding no "established admiralty rule" with
regard to marine insurance, decided that regulation of it would remain
23
"where it has been-with the states."
Without attempting to reconcile the various approaches of the court
to the supremacy doctrine, it is sufficient to say that it is clear that substantive and procedural infringements, even if merely tending to restrict
the flexibility of the admiralty, must yield to the maritime law. The
"practical" infringement of the present case seems no less susceptible
to the supremacy doctrine. The local law is no longer compatible, even
in a supplemental sense,2 4 when it becomes restrictive of a federal right.
II
The second objection raised by the dissent is that unseaworthiness
and Jones Act actions are separate and distinct causes of action.
Admittedly the Jones Act was passed in order to give a seaman redress for injury occasioned by the negligence of officers or crew members,
the older unseaworthiness action arising only from injuries caused by
defects in the ship or its appliances. 25 But, however great the gap
filled in by the Jones Act may once have been, for most practical purposes
it ceased to exist upon the handing down of Mahnich v.Southern S.S.
Co., 20 which held that injury to a seaman caused by unseaworthiness
brought about by the negligence of an officer of the ship, was grounds
for an unseaworthiness action. This extension of the doctrine to cover
operating negligence resulting in unseaworthiness, coupled with the
i Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308 (1919).
15 Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
"gLevinson
v. Deupree, 345 'U.S. 648 (1953).
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
21
Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
2

Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941).

Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 at 321 (1955).
Nust v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941). See text at note 22 supra.
'" See 357 U.S. at 321 (discussion and citations therein).
2'321 U.S. 96 (1944).
2

2

1959]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

assertion by Justice Stone that the shipowner had an absolute duty to
furnish a seaworthy ship,27 and with the subsequent broad interpretations
of what constitutes unseaworthiness, has all but swallowed up the func28
tions of the Jones Act.
There being little left to distinguish the two actions, it is difficult to
sustain the proposition voiced by the dissent that "each creates a separate
and independent cause of action not covered or made redressable by the
other." 29 Of greater significance however is the fact that the unseaworthiness action has virtually supplanted the Jones Act as a recovery
device. 30 This being so, uniformity in its application becomes an increasingly fit object for judicial contemplation.
III
The third objection raised by the dissent is the one with the most
far reaching implications; it is that the holding of the court invites
inconsistency in the application of a federal maritime law.81
It is convenient to discuss the inconsistency objections in the light
of the two doctrines invoked by the Court-supremacy and uniformityand a third, which is impliedly observed, the humanitarian doctrine.
Inconsistent results will follow as a matter of course if a narrow view
of the holding prevails, because literally interpreted it says no more
than that a state limitation cannot restrict a seaman's "right" to join
an unseaworthiness count with a Jones Act count as long as the latter
is available. It follows that if an unseaworthiness action is brought
separately no conflict could exist and hence no objection to the limitation.
Thus the present case would seem to be one merely of conflicts, calling
upon the supremacy of the general maritime law is its ratio decidendi.
27 Id. at 103-04.
11 "The only case which is today clearly outside the scope of the unseaworthiness
doctrine is the almost theoretical construct of an injury whose only cause is an
order improvidently given by a concededly competent officer on a ship admitted in
all respects to be seaworthy." GIMORE AND BLACK, ADMIRALTY § 6-39, at 320

(1957).

2'357 U.S. at 230. Cf. Pate v. Standard Dredging Corp., 193 F.2d 498 (5th Cir.
1952), wherein it was held (with reference to section 1441 (c) of the Judicial Code
which provides for the removability of Jones Act actions to federal courts when
coupled with a removable action) that an unseaworthiness count was not a sufficiently "separate and independent claim or cause of action" to communicate its
removability to the Jones Act count.
30 "It is safe to predict, unless the Supreme Court reverses its field a second
time, that in another ten years the Jones Act will have become a faint and ghostly
echo and the law of recovery for maritime injuries will be stated in terms of
unseaworthiness alone." GILMORE AND BLACK, ADMIRALTY § 6-38, at 316 (1957).
11 Suppose, for example, that in the instant case a stevedore had been injured
in the same fall with McAllister, it being determined subsequently that the injuries
were proximately caused by the unseaworthy condition of the ship. McAllister,
by tacking on a Jones Act count had, by virtue of this decision, a full three years in
which to prosecute his unseaworthiness claim; but the stevedore, since he would
have had no claim under the Jones Act, would have had to bring his unseaworthiness
claim separately, subject therefore to the Texas limitations period of two years.
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But Justice Brennan would insert a uniformity requirement to avoid
the bugaboo of inconsistency, even though the case does not turn on that
point and such a result is heedless of the lex fori doctrine. Yet, it would
seem that the result asked for is clearly sound and amply justified.
Although the majority opinion apparently addresses the problem strictly
from the supremacy side, the supremacy doctrine has as its principal
basis the desirability of uniformity, so that if the Jones Act limitation
period is to be drawn upon, either directly or by analogy, it would be
desirable for the result to be as uniform as possible.38 Furthermore, the
pre-eminent position to which the unseaworthiness action has vaulted
would seem to justify clothing it with the dignity of uniformity. Finally,
it may be said that local standards as to the staleness of injury claims
based on federally created maritime rights are no longer competent to
be applied and that the unseaworthiness action should be freed altogether
from the vagaries of fifty-odd legislative opinions.
If, then, the uniformity requirements laid down in the concurring
opinion are followed, the limitation period applied to unseaworthiness
actions would be the same in all cases and inconsistency objections would
be obviated.
One other factor remains to be considered along with the supremacy
and uniformity doctrine. It stems from the long clung-to principle that
seamen are wards of the admiralty. 34 This paternal attitude is invoked
as the "humanitarian" doctrine, the effect of which has been largely to
insure that these "poor and friendless" wards recover for all their
maritime injuries. The net result is that humanitarian considerations
have played a major part in shaping the present law governing recovery
for maritime injury, 5 and it may well be that such considerations prevail over all others.3 6 Indeed, it would seem that the ultimate basis for
the decision in the instant case is the humanitarian doctrine, the supremacy doctrine being merely adjunctive to the result. It has been
noted that this case resolves a conflicts problem; but in order for a conflict to be established with a state law there must be, of course, some
federal maritime rule with which it competes. Allowance of the joinder
of unseaworthiness and Jones Act counts so long as the latter is available has never been held a, federal right. But apparently, the Court,
thinking it desirable to give the seaman this benefit, fashioned a new
and Garrett v. Moore32 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917)
McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942). See discussion 357 U.S. at 230.
"See Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, at 244, 245 (1942).
"See 321 U.S. at 103-104.
"Id.
""Since the court has repeatedly emphasized the humanitarian grounds for its
decisions in this field since the early 1940's, it seems arguable that the Hawn rule is
not so much a rule of federal supremacy as a rule that seamen are to have the
advantage in any court of whatevei" rules of law, substantive, or procedural, may
be most favorable to them." Gr.moRE AND BI.AcK, AnmmALTv § 6-60, at 384 (1957).
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rule to that effect, determined that the state rule conflicted therewith,
and by virtue of the supremacy doctrine held that the state rule could
not be applied.
CONCLUSION

It would seem that an injured seaman's attorney has a choice of
courses to pursue, and may stress any one or a combination of the three
doctrines, depending upon the position of his client. If, for instance, he
is seeking to prosecute an unseaworthiness claim (not joined with a
Jones Act count) after the local statute of limitations has run but before
three years had passed from the date of his injury, he could stress the
uniformity argument advanced by Justice Brennan, contending that the
three year limitation period of the Jones Act was intended to be applied
to all unseaworthiness actions, conjoined with a Jones Act count or not.
If, on the other hand, he is attempting to prosecute a claim before the
state statute has run, but after three years time, he could point out that
the holding of McAllister is confined to situations in which unseaworthiness counts are joined with Jones Act counts and is therefore inapplicable
to his case. In either case he could probably successfully invoke the
"humanitarian" doctrine, contending in the first instance, that the McAllister decision was intended to give all maritime workers the benefit
of at least three years time in which to begin the prosecution of their
claims, and in the second instance that if he isn't allowed to prosecute his
claim beyond three years, as the state statute allows, he is being deprived
of "full benefit" of his federal right.
However, if supremacy and uniformity are to mean anything at all,
it is submitted that a court called upon to construe this decision should
use Justice Brennan's opinion as a guide, and strictly apply the three
year Jones Act limitation by analogy. The security to litigants, if not
deference to Congress, afforded by this approach would more than
justify giving such a "legislative" interpretation to the holding. Certainly, in the light of the recent judicially-wrought metamorphosis of the
maritime law, it would cause few blushes.
ROBERT B. EVANS

Civil Procedure-Additur-Power of Court to Increase Jury Award
Generally, courts have long accepted remittitur1 as a procedural
device by which they can, with the plaintiff's consent, 2 reduce the
'Neese v. Southern Ry., 350 U.S. 77 (1955) ; Gila Valley, G. & N. Ry. v. Hall,
232 U.S. 94 (1914) ; Blunt v. Little, 3 Fed. Cas. 760, No. 1578 (C.C.D. Mass., 1822) ;
New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. v. Curtis, 264 Ala. 137, 85 So. 2d 441 (1955);
Stalicup v. Rathbun, 76 Ariz. 63, 258 P.2d 821 (1953); Hyatt v. McCoy, 194

N.C. 760, 140 S.E. 807 (1927); Tice v. Mandel, 76 N.W.2d 124 (N.D. 1956).

' Defendant's consent is not needed. If both plaintiff and defendant consent
to the judgment, the need for remittitur is eliminated and the court may enter
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amount of an excessive jury award as a condition to denying defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground of excessive damages.
They have, however, been reluctant3 to accept additur.4 Additur is a
procedural device by which courts, with the defendant's consent, increase the amount of an inadequate jury award as a condition to denying
plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the ground of inadequate damages.5
When the validity of additur is questioned in a jurisdiction which
permits the use of remittitur, three courses are open to the court: it
may (1) permit the use of additur in light of its accepted use of
remittitur, 6 (2) deny the use of additur, yet allow the use of remittitur7
or (3) deny the use of additur with an indication that the use of remittitur will be denied in the future.
In the recent case of Caudle v. Swanson,8 additur received its first
examination by the North Carolina court. Plaintiff-builder brought
suit to recover the unpaid building costs of a house. The jury returned
a verdict of $6,192 for the plaintiff. The trial court found that the
award was inadequate, 9 and, with the defendant's consent, increased it
by $500. The plaintiff excepted to the use of this procedure, contending
that it deprived him of his right to trial by a jury as guaranteed by the
Constitution of North Carolina. 10 Rejecting the plaintiff's contention,
the court approved the use of additur on the basis of its established
recognition of remittitur. 11
The same constitutional objection as raised by the plaintiff in the
principal case is voiced by defendants in remittitur cases.12 In those
a consent judgment. King v. King, 225 N.C. 639, 35 S.E.2d 893 (1945) ; Jones v.
Griggs, 223 N.C. 279, 25 S.E.2d 862 (1943).
' Some states have provided for the use of additur by statute. See, e.g., R.I. GEN.
LAws ANN. Ch. 23 § 9-23-1 (1956) ; WAs H. REv. CoDE § 4.76.030 (1952).
'This Note is limited to the use of additur in cases involving unliquidated
damages. An increase in damages by the court, in cases involving liquidated
damages, is not subject to the same criticism since in those cases the amount of
damages is fixed and the only issue for the jury is the fact of liability. Fornara v.
Wolpe, 26 Ariz. 383, 226 Pac. 203 (1924); Harris v. McLaughlin, 39 Colo. 459,
90 Pac. 93 (1907).
'Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935); Dorsey v. Barba, 38 Cal. 2d 350,
240 P.2d 604 (1952) ; Genzel v. Halvorson, 248 Minn. 527, 80 N.W.2d 854 (1957)
Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 P.2d 826 (1958).
' Genzel v. Halvorson, supra note 5; Bodon v. Suhrmann, supra note 5.
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935); Dorsey v. Barba, 38 Cal. 2d 350,
250 P.2d 604 (1952).
8 248 N.C. 249, 103 S.E.2d 357 (1958).
' Generally, the plaintiff makes a motion for a new trial because of inadequacy
of damages and the court, as a condition to denial of this motion, accepts the
defendant's consent to the increased verdict. However, there is no indication in
the record
that plaintiff made such a motion here.
"0 N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 19.
" Cohoon v. Cooper, 186 N.C. 26, 118 S.E. 834 (1923) ; Isley v. Bridge Co.,
143 N.C. 51, 55 S.E. 416 (1906).
"2Arkansas Valley Land and Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69 (1889); Hughes
v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 79 Cal. App. 2d 703, 180 P.2d 419 (1940) ; Sewell v.
Sewell, 91 Fla. 982, 109 So. 98 (1926) ; Henderson v. Dreyfus, 26 N.M. 541, 191
Pac. 442 (1919) ; Weatherspoon v. Stackland, 127 Ore. 450, 271 Pac. 741 (1928).
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cases, the court's answer is that the defendant has no right to complain
because the reduction benefits him by requiring him to pay less than the
amount awarded by the jury. By the same token, our court reasoned
that the plaintiff had no right to complain about the use of additur since
he was in fact benefited by its use.
It is argued that a trial by jury necessarily implies a trial by a
properly functioning jury.' 3 Thus, if the trial court must increase the
jury award so that the damages will not be inadequate, it is obvious that
the jury has not functioned properly. And, though the plaintiff has
benefited by the use of the additur procedure, it is conceivable that a
properly functioning jury at a new trial might award greater damages
than those awarded with the use of the additur procedure. 14 It is also
contended that a trial by jury includes a determination by the jury of
both the existence of liability and the amount of damages to be awarded.
When a court resorts to the use of additur, it cannot be said that the
jury determined the final amount of damages awarded.' 5 Has the
plaintiff had his right to a jury trial when the final amount of damages
awarded was found by the trial court and not by the jury?
In the principal case it was stated that the defendant waived his
constitutional right to trial by jury. by consenting to the use of the
additur procedure. The consenting defendant pays a reasonable amount
determined by the trial court; however, the non-consenting defendant
is faced with a new trial, additional expenses, and the gamble as to what
the new jury will award. Might it not be said that this is a legalized
coercive type consent? Of course, if there were no coercion it is
highly unlikely that defendants would consent.
The court in Caudle stated that if they held the trial court lacked the
power to increase the verdict by $500, they "would be required to
remand the case for a judgment upon the verdict in the sum of $6,192."''1
The implication of this language is that the court was of the opinion
that the original jury verdict was adequate or, at least, not so inadequate
as to warrant a new trial 17 for abuse of discretion. Since the trial
court, by its use of additur, indicated that the verdict was inadequate,
would it not have been more accurate for the Supreme Court to have
Note,
21 VA. L.theREv.
666 (1935).
In Wisconsin,
defendant may prevent a new trial by consenting to an
increased verdict which equals the maximum amount of damages which could be
awarded as a matter of law. Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 214 N.W. 374
(1927) ; Note, 27 MARQ. L. Rzv.-86 (1943).
11 Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 W. VA. L. Q. 1 (1942).
16 248 N.C. at 261, 103 S.E.2d at 366.
"'x"While the judgment recites the trial court was of opinion that the amount
'"

14

of damages awarded was inadequate, he did not exercise the power of discretion
vested in him to set the verdict aside on that ground, and, in our opinion, it cannot

be said that his refusal was an abuse of his discretion."
S.E.2d at 362.

248 N.C. at 256, 103
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said, instead, that if additur was improper they would remand the case
to the trial court for exercise of its discretion, and not for "judgment on
the verdict"?
As indicated above it appears that the additur procedure denies the
plaintiff his right to trial by jury; however, in light of the remittitur
precedent in North Carolina, our court's decision rests on logical
ground.
NIcK J. MILLER
Constitutional Law-Discretionary Power of the Secretary of State
to Deny Passports
The power of the Secretary of State to deny passports for reasons
other than those established by congressional legislation was rejected
by the Supreme Court in the recent case of Kent v. Dulles.' To understand adequately the problem involved in that case it is necessary to
review briefly the historical and legal background of the present passport
laws. 2
Originally, passports were issued by a multiplicity of federal, state,
and local officers. 3 A statute4 enacted in 1856 and, with minor amendments, codified in 1926 changed this practice. This statute remains the
basis of the present passport laws. Its pertinent provision reads:
"The Secretary of State may grant and issue passports . . .
under such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe
for and on behalf of the United States, and no other person
shall grant, issue, or verify such passports."
The Secretary assumed that under this statute and the executive order
issued pursuant to it 5 he had the discretionary power to deny a passport. Until recently that power had never been questioned. 6
U.S. 116 (1958).
'This Note will deal with the Secretary's power to deny passports and with
the substantive grounds for such denial. It will consider only incidentally the
related problem of procedural due process in the denial of passports.
' See 357 U.S. at 123.
' 11 STAT. 60 (1856) (later amended by 44 STAT. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211a
(1952)).
'Exec. Order No. 7856 (1938), 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.1-.77 (1958). This order
outlined certain procedural rules and in § 51.77 authorized the Secretary to promulgate additional regulations not inconsistent therewith.
' The first case mentioning passports in the Supreme Court was Urtetiqui v.
D'Arcy, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692 (1835), where the Court, in a frequently quoted
dictum, described the passport as a political document whose issuance was in the
sole discretion of the Secretary. Briefly stated, the basis of the viewpoint thus
expressed was that the inherent power of the Chief Executive to exercise sole
discretion in conducting foreign affairs encompassed the issuance of passports,
because the traveler's activities abroad might conflict with our foreign policy and
because the government was in some measure obligated to protect citizens abroad.
For a good exposition of this point of view, see Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561,
1357
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A passport has never been a prerequisite to travel in peacetime. 7 A
1918 statute,8 making it unlawful for a person to leave or enter the
United States without a passport while a presidential proclamation of
war was in force, was so amended 9 early in 1941 that the President might
invoke its provisions in the then-existing emergency. The statute,
altered so that it could be invoked in any national emergency, was reenacted in 1952.10 The necessary proclamations were made so that
continuously since 1941 a passport has been a legal prerequisite to exit
from the United States. 1 In the light of this requirement, the power of
the Secretary of State to deny passports has assumed a new importance
12
and has been subjected to a critical re-examination.
Beginning in the late 1940's the State Department began rejecting
passport applications on the ground that issuance to the applicant in
question would be "against the best interests" of the United States.'"
This practice was first challenged in Bauer v. Acheson14 where the
Federal District Court for the District of Columbia recognized the
constitutional right of a citizen to travel 15 and held that the right could
566-68 (D.C. Cir. 1957).

This, combined with the supposed statutory authority
under the cited legislation, was generally thought to give the Secretary a two-fold
basis for his actions.
It is merely a convenience in international travel, its chief use being to
establish the citizenship of the bearer. 357 U.S. at 121. Persons denied a passport
have generally traveled without one.
S40 STAT. 559 (1918).
9 55 STAT. 252 (1941).
1066 STAT. 190 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1185(b) (1952).
' The statute was invoked in 1941 before the United States entered World
War II. Proclamation No. 2523, 55 STAT. 1696 (1941). This period ended in
1952 by Proclamation No. 2974, 66 STAT. C31 (1952). But the provisions of the
statute were extended several times, eventually to April 1, 1953. 66 STAT. 54, 57,
96, 137, 330, 333 (1952). The Korean crisis was declared by Proclamation No.
2914, 64 STAT. A454 (1950). This, however, did not inoke the statute, which
at that time was restricted in its terms to the World War II emergency. The
1952 act, applying to any emergency, was invoked in January, 1953, prior to the
expiration of the statutory extension of the World War II proclamation. Proclamation No. 3004, 67 STAT. C31 (1953). Thus the prohibition was continuously
in effect from 1941.
1" Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958) ; Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958);
Kraus v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 840 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; Robeson v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 810
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 895 (1956) ; Boudin v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 532
(D.C. Cir. 1956) ; Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ; Dulles v.
Nathan, 225 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445
(D.D.C. 1952).
13 From the nature of the transaction involved there is no public record of a
number of such "best interests" denials. In most cases it appeared that the
refusal was based on the applicant's membership in the Communist party or his
affiliation with the Communist cause. See Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 171 (1952),
for a documented collection of individual instances of such refusals prior to the
first court test.
"' 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952) where plaintiff had her passport revoked
without notice or hearing. The Secretary was ordered to restore it or accord
the plaintiff a hearing.
1" The existence of this right has not been disputed in any of the cases in this
field, yet the courts have some difficulty in finding an authoritative basis for it.
There is no clear historical evidence to rely on for its existence, and the framers
of the Bill of Rights make no mention of it. The cases in general draw heavily
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not be denied without according the citizen the procedural due process
requirements of notice and hearing. Presumably, as a result of this
decision the Secretary promulgated regulations listing membership in
the Communist party or affiliation with the Communist movement as
substantive grounds for denial and establishing administrative procedures for appeal of passport denials. 18
The first court test of a substantive ground for denial of a passport
was in Shachtman v. Dulles.17 Here the applicant had been given a
"best interests" denial because he was the president of an organization
on the Attorney General's list of subversive organizations. The court
found that the grounds for denial employed by the Secretary were not
related to foreign affairs on that level which was beyond the power of the
courts to review, generally termed the political level. Thus the Secretary
could not rely solely on his discretion for such denial. Strengthened by
the admission of the Secretary that the passport might have been granted
but for the Attorney General's listing, the court held the denial
arbitrary and thus invalid. It is to be noted that in this case the
Secretary did not rely on any of his written regulations in denying the
passport, so that they were not called into question. The importance of
the case lies in the court's assertion of the right to review the substantive grounds of a denial and its invalidation of those grounds upon
finding them to be arbitrary and to lie in an area where the Secretary
could not exercise his discretion arbitrarily. This, by implication, acknowledged that in the area reasonably related to foreign affairs on the
political level the Secretary has absolute discretion which is not reviewable.18
Other cases appealing passport denials were disposed of on procedural or other grounds that are not relevant here.1
on an analogy to the right of interstate travel cited in Williams v. Fears, 179
U.S. 270 (1900). Until recently there was argument as to whether such a right
should be based on the first or the fifth amendment. The Supreme Court in the
instant case resolved the arguments by stating that such a right exists and that
it is an element of "liberty" protected by the fifth amendment. 357 U.S. at 125-27.
18 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.135-.142 (1958). Sections 51.135-.136 establish the substantive grounds for denial. The following sections provide for administrative procedure, including the establishment of the Board of Passport Appeals. Section
51.142 provides that at any stage of the process of application or appeal the applicant
may be required to execute under oath as part of the application a statement as
to past and present membership in the Communist party. This requirement has
figured prominently in several cases herein discussed.
225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
In the similar case of Kraus v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 840 (D.C. Cir. 1956), the

court held that denial of a passport to the applicant because he still owed the
State Department for paying his way home previously and because he refused to
show that he was in such financial condition that this would not happen again was
held to be 'arbitrary, since it did not appear to be a test applied to all applicants.
Note that here, as in Shachtinan, the grounds relied on were not in the Secretary's
written regulations.
" Robeson v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 895
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Kent v. Dulles, presenting squarely for the first time the question of
the Secretary's discretionary authority to deny passports, is the first
passport case to reach the Supreme Court since World War 11.20 The
cases of Rockwell Kent, the artist, and Walter Briehl, a psychiatrist,
were combined for this appeal from the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia. 21 The facts are identical in their important
details. Petitioners applied for passports and were tentatively refused
because of their Communist affiliations. Each refused to execute an
affidavit concerning past or present membership in the Communist party.
Each was accorded an informal hearing and was later informed that in
view of his refusal to execute the affidavit the Board of Passport Appeals
could not give further consideration to his appeal. Each brought suit,
and in each suit summary judgment was awarded the Secretary of State.
On appeal the court of appeals divided, the majority finding that the
Secretary had the statutory authority to deny passports on the grounds
stated and that denial on these grounds was constitutional.
The Supreme Court reversed this decision by a vote of five to four.
It stated without too much discussion that the right to travel is an
element of "liberty" protected by the fifth amendment, so that a citizen
could not be deprived of it without due process of law. The Court found
that the political function of the passport had become subordinate to that
of control over exit so that issuance could no longer be argued to be
within the sole discretion of the Chief Executive. Summarily dismissing
the possibility that the regulation could be made under the war power at
the present time, it concluded that Congress alone had the power to
establish substantive grounds for denial of passports.
Finding no specific delegation of authority by Congress, the Court
considered whether Congress, in legislating on passport regulations, had
by implication made the administrative practice of denying passports to
Communists part of the law. It found that at the time of the 1926 act
grounds for denial had "jelled" into two categories, allegiance to the
United States and participation in illegal conduct.2 2 The Court found
that the grounds in question fell into neither of these categories, and it
(1956) ; Boudin v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; Dulles v. Nathan, 225

F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
2 Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958), decided on the same day as Kent,
presented the question of the constitutionality of the use of confidential information
by the Secretary in denying passports. It was disposed of on the grounds stated in

Kent.

"Kent v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d
561 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
22 The first of these is based on a statute. 14 STAT. 54 (1866), as amended,
22 U.S.C. § 212 (1952). As authority for the second the Court cites 3 MooRE,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL .LAw § 512 (1906) ; 3 HACKWORTE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 268 (1942); and 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 401 (2d rev.

ed. 1945).
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refused to impute to Congress in passing the 1952 act, making a passport
necessary to travel, a purpose not already clearly established in administrative practice. 23 It therefore held that the Secretary did not
have the power to deny passports in his sole discretion as he had claimed,
either by the inherent power of the Chief Executive or by congressional
delegation of the power.
The Court explicitly refused to treat the constitutional merits of the
substantive grounds for denial the Secretary had employed, construing
the statutes involved strictly so as to avoid the question. But the whole
decision is written in a context that leaves little doubt but that it
entertains grave misgivings about the constitutionality of these regulations. Its language categorizing the practice of the Secretary of State
as a denial of the right to travel because of political beliefs and associations24 admits of no other inference.
The minority argued 25 that the intent of Congress in passing the
legislation making a passport a prerequisite to travel was to sanction
just such practices as were challenged by the plaintiffs in this case. It
questions the majority's summary dismissal of the applicability of the war
power of the Chief Executive to the present situation. Indeed, it says
that rather than being irrelevant, the war-time practice may be the only
relevant one, since passports are a prerequisite for travel only during
proclaimed periods of war or emergency. It would hold that the war
power would sanction such regulation as is challenged by the plaintiff
in this case. On these grounds the dissenters would affirm the Secretary's power to make such denials.
The logic of the minority seems to the writer sounder than that of
the majority. Yet as a matter of law the result reached by the majority
seems to be the better view under the circumstances. Delegation by
Congress of the power to regulate individual rights should be explicit
and unequivocal. 26 It should not be found in implied ratification of an
administrative practice. In refusing to do so the majority was pursuing
a sound policy.
" The Court relied somewhat on the fact that there was a statute on the books
dealing with issuance of passports to Communists. Internal Security Act of
1950, 64 STAT. 987, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-98 (1952). It felt that even though certain
conditions precedent to its becoming operative had not yet been fulfilled, this
statute, in the absence of any other specific legislation on the subject, pre-empted the
field and negated the inference that Congress might have sanctioned any regulation
under the statutes on which the Secretary relied. It would seem that in view of
the fact that the Internal Security Act is a criminal statute, not yet effective, and
not a delegation of restrictive power to the Secretary who issues passports, this
argument is of doubtful validity.
21357 U.S. at 130.
2 Ibid.

2 For three excellent examples of such a policy on the part of the Court, see
United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46 (1953) (House of Representatives
resolution) ; Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 156 (1946) (federal statute);
Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 301-02 (1944) (executive order).
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The impact of the decision in Kent on the practical problem of regulating passports is unfortunate. It leaves the Secretary powerless to
deny passports save on the limited grounds approved in that decision.
There is a real and pressing necessity for such regulation.27 The
problem admits of no uncertainty in its solution, for it is vital to the interests of the nation as a whole.
The Communist party openly seeks as its ultimate goal world revolution; to attribute to it any lesser aim is to ignore the essence of its
existence. We need cite no authority that its machinations are the
greatest concern of our government today. Statements to the effect that
denial of a passport on the basis of membership in the Communist party
or adherence to its cause is denial merely on the basis of "political
beliefs and associations" are open to serious question. It is hoped that
the use of such language by the majority in Kent was inadvertent.
That the exigencies of the moment should be used as grounds for
denial of constitutional rights is contrary to the basic principles of free
government.2 8 But, on the other hand, it must be recognized that there
is a problem that touches on the well-being of the nation, and that there
are citizens whose purposes in going abroad justify their being forced
to forfeit their rights. The problem must be to find some way to
determine, using substantive criteria established by congressional authority and standard procedures that protect the individual from arbitrary
action, whether the individual in question deserves to forfeit his right
to travel.
E. OSBORNE AYscuE, JR.
Constitutional Law-Little Rock School Litigation-Re-examination
of North Carolina Laws
[T]he Constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated
against in school admission on grounds of race or color . .. can

neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or
state executive or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by
them through evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted
"ingeniously or ingenuously."'
With these words, the Supreme Court in Cooper v. Aaron2 emphati-

" This necessity is evidenced by the fact that several days after this decision
was handed down the President sent a message to Congress urging legislation
delegating the power to regulate to the Secretary. It read in part: "I wish to
emphasize the urgency of the legislation I have recommended. Each day and
week that passes without it exposes us to great danger." 104 CoNG. REc. 11849
(1958). The Eighty-fifth Congress adjourned without having acted on this problem.
28 Ex parte Endo, 393 U.S. 283 (1944).
1 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958) quoting from Smith v. Texas, 311
U.S. 128, 132 (1940).
358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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cally rejected the application of the Little Rock School Board for a two
and one-half year suspension of its court-approved s desegregation
program. In order to fully appreciate the import of this decision, a
brief review of its background is necessary.
On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court, in the Brown case, 4 held that
enforced racial segregation in the public schools of a state denied the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
The Court expressly overruled the "separate but equal" doctrine of
Plessy v. Ferguson5 which bad been relied on by the southern states for
almost fifty years. However, the Court delayed formulation of a decree
to effectuate this decision pending further argument. This decree was
rendered May 31, 1955, 6 and called for the district courts concerned to
require "a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance"' 7 with
the Brown ruling and to take such action as was necessary to bring
about the end of racial segregation in the public schools "with all deliberate speed." s
The Court pointed out that once such a start had been made, the
courts might find that additional time was necessary to carry out the
ruling in an effective manner, but that the burden was on the defendants
to establish that such time was necessary.
Following these decisions, the Little Rock District School Board
formulated a plan for desegregation. This plan was approved by the
district court 9 and in pursuance thereof, nine Negroes were scheduled
to be admitted in September 1957 to Central High School which had
over 2,000 students. This plan failed, however, when the Governor
of the state dispatched units of the Arkansas National Guard to the
school grounds and placed the school "off limits" to colored students. 10
Upon investigation, the district court found that the Governor was
obstructing the court-approved plan of desegregation and entered a
preliminary injunction against him and officers of the National Guard
enjoining prevention of the attendance of Negro children at Central
High School, and other obstruction or interference with the orders of
the court in connection with the desegregation plan." The National
Guard was removed and on Monday, September 23, 1957, the nine
Negro children entered the high school under the protection of the
'Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Ark. 1957), aff'd, 243 F.2d 361
(8th Cir. 1957).
' Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
'T Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
8
Id. at 300.
Id. at 301.
' Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Ark. 1957), af'd, 243 F.2d 361 (8th
Cir. 1957).
10 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Ark. 1957), aff'd, Faubus v. United
States, 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1958).
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Little Rock Police Department. They were removed, however, because
of difficulties in controlling a large and demonstrating crowd which had
gathered.
On September 25, 1957, the President dispatched federal troops to
the school and the Negro students were admitted.12 Later the federal
troops were replaced by federalized National Guardsmen who stayed
at the school for the remainder of the school year.
In February 1958, the School Board filed a petition in the district
court seeking a postponement of its program of desegregation. 13 It was
contended that because of the extreme public hostility, attributed by the
Supreme Court to the attitudes of the Governor and the legislature, a
sound education system could not. be maintained with the attendance of
the Negro students at Central High School.
The district court granted the relief requested by the board.14 This
was reversed by the court of appeals' 5 and the reversal was affirmed by
the Supreme Court in the present litigation. 16
Although the Court was called upon to decide only one narrow
point, viz., whether or not open hostility by the people of a state toward
a School Board's plan for desegregation is sufficient reason to warrant
a delay of such plan, it very painstakingly stated its position regarding
the whole school desegregation problem. With its assertion that no
evasive scheme to avoid desegregation would be tolerated whether it be
attempted "ingeniously or ingenuously"'17 it indicated that no plan
would be allowed to circumvent the order of the Court.
Is North Carolina affected by this decision? This state has a threefold plan for dealing with the problems posed by the Brown decision.' s
It consists of (1) a pupil assignment law vesting authority in the local
school boards to assign students residing within their administrative
See Pollitt, PresidentialUse of Troops to Execute the Laws: A Brief History,
REv. 117 (1957).
" Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Ark. 1958).
14 Aaron v. Cooper, supra.note 13.
The 1955 Brown case language to the effect
that additional time might be necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective
manner once a start had been made was construed to mean that such time would be
allowed when necessary to preserve the public peace. The Supreme Court, however,
rejected this view and quoted from Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917), as
follows: "It is urged that this proposed segregation will promote the public peace
by preventing race conflicts. Desirable as this is, and important as is the preservation of the public peace, this aim cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances
which deny rights created or protected by the Federal Constitution."
15Aaron v. Cooper, 257 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1958).
2' The Court rendered the decision September 12, 1958, but the opinion was not
given until September 29, 1958.
talented, clever, shrewd, or inventive while ingenuous
1 Ingenious means
implies high-mindedness or candor. Webster's New International Dictionary.
" For an excellent discussion of North Carolina's new legislative enactments
and constitutional amendments on education, see Wettach, North Carolina School
Legislation, 35 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1956).
12

36 N.C.L.
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units to a public school, 19 (2) an amendment to the state constitution
which provides for education expense grants to be given to students to
enable them to attend private schools under certain conditions, and 20 (3)
an amendment to the constitution known as the local option plan whereby
the people of a local unit may close their schools when a majority of its
21
electorate so desires,
This plan originated in the report of a committee 22 appointed by
Governor William B. Umstead and headed by the Honorable Thomas J.
Pearsall, "to study the difficult and far reaching problems"23 presented
by the Brown decision. Under the heading of "Recommendations and
Conclusions," the committee reported inter alia, the following:
The mixing of the races forthwith in the public schools throughout
the State cannot be accomplished and should not be attempted.
The schools of our State are so intimately related to the customs
and feelings of the people of each community that their effective
operation is impossible except in conformity with community attitudes. The Committee feels that the compulsory mixing of the
races in our schools, on a State-wide basis and without regard to
local conditions and assignment factors other than race, would
to such an extent that they
alienate public support of the schools
24
could not be operated successfully.
This report, along with the brief that the state had filed in the Brown
case, 25 was "approved as a declaration of the policy of the state"20 by
the North Carolina General Assembly.
In order to implement this policy, the North Carolina General Assembly, on the Pearsall committee's recommendation, enacted the Pupil
11
0 N.C. Gz . STAT. §§ 115-176 through -179 (1955).
N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 12.
21
Ibid.
22 This committee was first entitled the Special Advisory Committee on Education and was later denominated the North Carolina Advisory Committee on
Education. It is commonly referred to as the Pearsall Committee.
"' N.C. Sess. Laws (1955), Resolution 29, at 1692.
2,Id. at 1693.
Although North Carolina was not a party to the litigation in the Brown
case, it was invited to file a brief amicus curiae. This brief, the purpose of which
was to aid the Supreme Court in formulating a plan to effectuate its 1954 desegregation decision, stated: "The people of North Carolina know the value of the public
school. They also know the value of a social structure in which two distinct races
can live together as separate groups, each proud of its own contribution to that
society and recognizing its dependence upon the other group. They are determined,
if possible, to educate all of the children of the State. They are also determined
to maintain their society as it now exists with separate and distinct racial groups
in the North Carolina community.
"The people of North Carolina firmly believe that the record of North Carolina
in the field of education demonstrates the practicability of education of separate
races in separate schools. They also believe that the achievements of the Negro
people of North Carolina demonstrate that such educational system has not instilled in them any sense of inferiority which handicaps them in their efforts to
make lasting and substantial contributions to their State." Quoted in N.C. Sess.
Laws (1955), Resolution 29, at 1693.
" N.C. Sess. Laws (1955), Resolution 29, at 1693.
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as the first part of the three-fold plan. Without
Assignment Act
mentioning race, the act merely directs each local school board 28 to assign
the children within the school district "so as to provide for the orderly
and efficient administration of the public schools, and provide for the
'2 9
effective instruction, health, safety, and general welfare of the pupils."
Pursuant to this plan, the local school boards have to date assigned
thirteen Negro children to what were formerly white schools. This is
in accord with the declared policy of the state"0 to allow each local unit
to decide whether or not it desires to desegregate.
Assuming that it is constitutional on its face, 31 is the plan constitutional in its context and application? Resolution 29 recites that "the
mixing of the races in the public schools within the State cannot be
accomplished and if attempted would alienate public support of the
'32
schools to such an extent that they could not be operated successfully.
But this very reason for postponing integration was asserted by the
Little Rock School Board and rejected by the Supreme Court in the
Cooper decision. Reading this state "policy" into the Pupil Assignment
Act as it now functions, it is believed that the Supreme Court would
find it either an "ingenious" or an "ingenuous" scheme by the state to
deprive Negro rights of the equal protection of the laws.33 It is not to
be doubted that the courts will be quick to strike down any action by
2

7

N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§§ 115-176 through -179 (1955).

Prior to these amendments, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-352 (1952) provided that
school children attend school within the district in which they resided unless assigned
elsewhere by the State Board of Education. The only criteria for making an
assignment outside the district in which the student resided was when it was more
economical for the efficient operation of the schools.
This new legislation authorizes each local
29 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-176 (1955).
board of education to assign students residing within its administrative unit to
a public school whether such school is within its administrative unit or not.
oN.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-176 (1955).
'In Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956), it was contended that the
North Carolina Pupil Enrollment Act (denominated Pupil Assignment Act by
1956 amendment) was unconstitutional on its face because it vested discretion in
an administrative body without adequate standards for the exercise of this discretion. The court held that, as to this contention, it was not unconstitutional on
its face. Alabama's school placement law, which like North Carolina's makes
no mention of race, was declared constitutional on its face in Shuttlesworth v.
Birmingham Board of Education, 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala. 1958), aff'd,
27 U.S.L. WIxa 3159 (U.S. Nov. 25, 1958), in spite of legislative resolutions
adopted before passage of the placement law which indicated an intention
not to follow the Browm case. However, it must be noted that the School
Board denied the petitioners' allegations that they were denied the right
to attend the white public schools solely on the basis of race and the
court found no evidence to indicate that this was the sole reason for such denial.
But see Adkins v. School Board of Newport News, 148 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va.
1957), aff'd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1957), where Virginia's school placement plan,
when considered in the light of its legislative history, was held to be so patently
unconstitutional on its face.
bad 2asN.C.
to be
Sess. Laws (1955), Resolution 29, 1692-93.
"2In the Virginia case, suPra note 31, the court held that inasmuch as the
criteria for assignment was based partly on the race of the applicant, that it was a
violation of the constitutional provision guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.
-1
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the local school boards pursuant to the plan which appears to be motivated
by race.
The second part of the plan recommended by the committee is found
in a 1956 amendment to the constitution and in legislative statutes of
the same year.3 4 These provisions authorize "payment of education
expense grants from any State or local public funds for the private
education of . . .a child who is assigned against the wishes of his
parents . . . to a public school attended by a child of another race."385

However, no child shall be eligible for such a grant unless he attends
a private school "recognized and approved under '36 and "found to be in
compliance with"37 article 32 of the North Carolina General Statutes on
Education.3 8 Since this is an integral part of the state's program designed to cope with the Brown decision, these grants, like the Pupil
Assignment Act, may be viewed in the light of the legislature's declared
policy, and if so viewed, their authorization would be constitutionally
suspect 3 9 Furthermore, in Rice v. Elmore, ° the court held that the
' N.C. CONsT. art. IX, § 12; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115-274 through -295 (1955).
" N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 12.

11 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-282 (1955).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-285 (1955).

11N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115-255 through -257 (1955). Private schools in
North Carolina cannot operate lawfully at any time unless they are regulated and
supervised by the State Board of Education and meet the standards required of
the public schools with respect to the following: (a) grading of instruction (b)
promotion of pupils (c) the courses of study for each grade (d) the manner in
which these courses are conducted (e) the qualifications and certification of teachers.
The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." It is state action which
is prohibited by the Constitution and not purely private action. As the Court
said in Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879) : "The constitutional provision,
therefore, must mean that no agency of the State . . . shall deny to any person
within its jurisdicton the equal protection of the laws." It is submitted that the
amount of private regulation embodied in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115-255 through
-257 (1955) might induce a holding that such schools are agencies of the
state so that denial of admission to Negroes by them because of race would be
unconstitutional. Certainly it has taken far less state regulation to class as state
action what is in form private action. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953),
where a private Texas organization held pre-primary, elections to determine their
candidates for the state primaries and restricted its membership to white persons.
The Court found this discrimination to be state action'although the Court split as
to the reasons for its conclusion.
" That the purpose for these grants is to avoid the desegregation order of the
Brown decisions cannot fairly be denied. Section 115-274 of the North Carolina
General Statutes states in'part that "Our people need to be assured that no child
will be forced to attend a school with children of another race in order to get an
education. It is the purpose of the State of North Carolina to make available,
under the conditions and qualifications set out in this article, education expense
grants for the private education of any child of any race residing in this State."
The courts have already struck down two evasive schemes which were designed
to avoid the desegregation order. See Aaron v. Cooper, 27 U.S.L. WEEK 2236
(8th Cir. Nov. 18, 1958), where private corporations leased state buildings to conduct schools on a segregated basis and Allen v. Charlottesville School Board, 27
U.S.L. WEEK 2173 (D.C. Va. Oct. 14, 195.8), where the State of Virginia paid
teachers to teach in private, segregated schools.
o165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).
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Democratic party must allow Negroes to vote in its primary elections
even though the state had repealed all laws which related to the Democratic party and it was functioning as a club. The court reasoned that
since primaries had become a part of the machinery for choosing public
officials, they should be subject to the same tests of discrimination as
those applied to general elections. If North Carolina private schools
admitted pupils who had availed themselves of state tuition grants,
might not the Court hold that these institutions thus became agencies of
the state, fulfilling the functions of the public schools, and require that
admission to these private schools be granted to Negroes on a nondiscriminatory basis ?41
42
The third and final part of the Pearsall plan is found in article IX
of the constitution and supplementing legislation of 1956. It permits
any board of education to "call for an election on the question of closing
the public schools" 48 and directs the board of education to suspend the
operation of such public schools "when a majority of the votes cast in
such election are in favor" 44 of suspending the schools. This plan has
not yet been put into operation and consequently has not been tested.
However, suits testing the constitutionality of the Arkansas and Virginia
school closing plans are now pending. In Virginia, the litigants contend
among other things that closing the schools in Norfolk while leaving
Richmond schools open denies Norfolk children equal protection of the
laws. Another possible argument is that legislation by the state authorizing the closing of a previously segregated white school if a Negro exercises his constitutional right to attend it is the use of a governmental
45
power to enforce segregation, and, hence is unlawful.
In conclusion, it must be noted that the Supreme Court in the Cooper
decision not only announced a decision, it also expressed a mood. It
went out of its way to point out that state officials take an oath of office
to support the Constitution of the United States and hence are obligated
to comply with the spirit as well as the terms of the desegregation decisions. One suspects that all plans aimed at continued segregation of
" The authorization of such grants by the state might be subject to attack from
still another angle. Any taxpayer who had not availed himself of such grants could
seek to enjoin this expenditure of state funds on the grounds that this would be a
non-public use of public funds in violation of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Teer v. Jordan, 232 N.C. 48, 59 S.E.2d 359 (1950), states
that a taxpayer has the legal right to bring an action against the state or any
agency which is using public funds for an unlawful purpose.
" N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 12.
," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-265 (1955).
"Ibid.
Professor Douglas B. Maggs of the Duke University Law School included
this argument in a prepared statement to a Joint Meeting of the Special Session
of the North Carolina General Assembly on the Legislation Proposed by the North
Carolina Advisory Committee on Education. (unpublished in University of North
Carolina Law School Library, 1956).
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school children will be nullified as either "ingenious" or "ingenuous"
attempts to evade the Constitution, a document which, as has been said,
is "colorblind."4 6
ROBERT G. WEBB
Constitutional Law-Military Jurisdiction Over Civilians
In the last two decades the United States has been confronted with a
major world war and a police action in Korea. These have necessitated
wholesale conscription of millions of American citizens to supply the
armies needed, and the additional use of citizens in civilian capacities to
complement these armies. In such situations the military requires
prompt and efficient means of dealing with personnel who commit acts
threatening the discipline and morale of the armed forces. Resort was
made to the age-old military tribunal, the court-martial.' Thus during
war time courts-martial have long exercised jurisdiction over uniformed
military personnel and civilians accompanying the armed forces in the
field.2
However, upon cessation of hostilities, there arises the question of
continued military jurisdiction over persons who committed crimes while
on active duty but were separated prior to being charged with such
crimes. The general rule was that a discharge or separation divested the
military of jurisdiction.3 In United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke,4
the Supreme Court held this rule applicable to one who was discharged
and immediately re-enlisted, reasoning that courts-martial could not
assume jurisdiction without a grant of congressional authority.
This case motivated Congress, 5 in enacting the new Uniform Code
of Military Justice6 (hereafter referred to as UCMJ), to include article
3(a),7 a provision retaining military jurisdiction over serious offenders
'"Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
'For a concise historical development of courts-martial, see WINTHROP,
MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS

45-51 (2d ed. reprint 1920).

'See, e.g., Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376 (1920); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S.

(20 How.) 65 (1858) ; Perlstein v. United States, 151 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1945) ;
Ex parte Campo, 71 F. Supp. 543 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub. nom. United States
ex rel. Campo v. Swenson, 165 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1947) ; In re Berue, 54 F. Supp.
252 (S.D. Ohio 1944) ; McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Va. 1943).
'MANUAL
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 14 (1951); MANUAL FOR
CoURTs-MARTim, U.S. ARmy, 9 (1949).
'336 U.S. 210 (1949).
' H.R. REP. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 11 (1949) ; S.REP. No. 486, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949).
610 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (Supp. V, 1958).
7 "[N]o person charged with having committed, while in a status in which
he was subject to this chapter, an offense against this chapter, punishable by confinement for five years or more and for which the person cannot be tried in the courts
of the United States ...may be relieved from amenability to trial by court-martial
by reason of the termination of that status." 10 U.S.C. § 803 (a) (Supp. V, 1958).
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who had been lost to courts-martial by reason of a termination of their
code status. Of equal constitutional significance is article 2(11), s which
grants military jurisdiction over all "persons serving with, employed by,
or accompanying the armed forces" without the continental limits of the
United States. These two jurisdictional provisions and their application
to persons not in uniform are the subject of this Note.
The constitutionality of article 3 (a) was squarely presented in United
States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,9 where it was held that petitioner, a discharged ex-serviceman who had severed all connections with the military,
could not constitutionally be tried by court-martial for offenses against
UCMJ committed while on active duty overseas. The Court emphasized
that the necessity for compelling obedience and order in the military
authorized Congress, under its power to make rules for the regulation
of the land and naval forces, 10 to establish courts-martial. However, the
Constitution did not authorize Congress to expand court-martial jurisdiction to include civilians whose relationship with the military had been
severed by discharge. The amenability of such civilians to military
tribunals had no proper relationship to continued maintenance of order
and discipline of the services, hence they could not be deprived of the
right to a trial by jury in a civil court.
When the constitutionality of article 2(11) was presented in 1956
the Supreme Court held," relying on the principle that constitutional
2
guarantees do not extend beyond the boundaries of the United States,'
that Congress could constitutionally subject civilian wives, accompanying their servicemen-husbands overseas, to trial by court-martial for the
murder of their husbands. On rehearing the following year the Court
in Reid v. Covert's reversed itself and held that the Constitution necessarily follows the flag since all authority for governmental action abroad
is derived from the Constitution. Thus, American citizens accompanying
the military overseas were entitled to the safeguards of the Bill of
Rights. 14 Four justices thought that the power to make regulations for
the land and naval forces did not encompass persons who could not
fairly be said to be in the military service, although they recognized
that there might be circumstances where a person could be in the armed
services even though he had not formally been inducted into the military.
They concluded that dependents of servicemen were not in the military
for purposes of trial by court-martial, stating that "a statute cannot be
810 U.S.C. § 802(11) (Supp. V, 1958).
11 (1955).
9350 U.S.
14.
CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl.
loU.S.

" Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956); Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487
(1956), 35 N.C.L. REv. 157.
12 Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) ; In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
12354 U.S. 1 (1957).
" U.S. CONsT. amend. I-IX.
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framed by which a civilian can lawfully be mnade amenable to the nilitary
jurisdiction in time of peace."' 5 The two concurring Justices', limited
their holding to capital cases involving dependents in peace time.
In United States ex rel. Guagliardov. McElroy,"' the Covert holding
was held inapplicable to a civilian employee of the Air Force convicted
and sentenced by court-martial under the authority of article 2(11) for
conspiracy' s to commit larceny. 19 Noting that federal courts prior to
UCMJ had also sustained military jurisdiction in similar cases, 20 the
court reasoned that civilian employees may be deemed part of the military
since certain civilians are indispensable to its operations. Following this
reasoning a later district court decision 2 ' held a civilian employed by the
22
military in France amenable to court-martial for premeditated murder.
In the recent case of Wheeler v. Reynolds,23 involving article 3(a),
a district court held an inactive reservist amenable to court-martial
jurisdiction for a murder he allegedly committed while on active duty
in Germany. Distinguishing the Toth case, the court found an assignment to the inactive reserve did not operate as a discharge so as to deprive the military of jurisdiction. However, prior to UCMJ it was
held 24 that an assignment to the inactive reserve was the equivalent of
a discharge, and the court refused to allow the reservists to be recalled
to active duty for the sole purpose of trial by court-martial. That the
discharge should no longer be the determinative factor since the passage
of UCMJ is shown by a case, 25 involving a fact situation essentially the
same as Hirshberg, where the Military Court of Appeals held that a
discharge did not divest courts-martial of jurisdiction for offenses committed during a former enlistment when the accused immediately reenlisted. Morale, discipline, and good order required punishment for
offenders still serving in the armed forces.
From the foregoing it appears that a discharged ex-serviceman who
has severed all relations with the military may not constitutionally be
18 354 U.S. at 35, quoting from WINTHROP, op. cit. supra note 1, at 107.
26 354 U.S. at 41, 65 (concurring opinions).
"' 158 F. Supp. 171 (D.D.C. 1958).
1810 U.S.C. § 881 (Supp. V, 1958).
'p10 U.S.C. § 921 (Supp. V, 1958).
2 The court cited: Hines v. Mikell, 259 Fed. 28 (4th Cir. 1919) ; McCune v.
Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Va. 1943) ; Ex parte Jochen, 257 Fed. 200 (S.D.
Tex. 1919) ; Ex parte Falls, 251 Fed. 415 (D.N.J. 1918). It should be noted that
these cases held only that the military could try civilians employed by the services
itthe field during time of war.
21 Grisham v. Taylor, 161 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Pa. 1958).
22 10 U.S.C. § 918 (Supp. V, 1958).
22164 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Fla. 1958).
2 United States ex rel. Viscardi v. MacDonald, 265 Fed. 695 (E.D.N.Y. 1920);
United States ex rel. Santantonio v. Warden, 265 Fed. 787 (E.D.N.Y. 1919).
The courts stated that inactive reservists were civilians subject to recall into active
service only "in time of war or national emergency." It is conceivable that the
same reasoning would apply today. See 10 U.S.C. § 672(a) (Supp. V, 1958).
" United States v. Gallagher, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 506, 22 C.M.R. 296 (1957).
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tried by court-martial for offenses committed while he was in uniform.2 6
However, military jurisdiction is not lost when the serviceman immediately re-enlists2 7 or retains an inactive reserve status. 28 Civilian
dependents accompanying the armed forces abroad may not be subjected
29
to a military trial in peace time when charged with a capital crime.
Whether this reasoning will be applied in civilian dependent non-capital
cases remains to be seen. However, a civilian employed by the armed

services abroad is deemed to have military status and consequently is
amenable to military jurisdiction, 30 even in capital cases. 3 '

It will be

interesting to see if the Supreme Court agrees that civilian employees
and inactive reservists are in the land and naval forces for purposes of
military trial in peace time.
RiCHA1RD VON BIBERSTEIN, JR.

Constitutional Law-Police Power-Changed Economic Condition of
Railroads Judicially Applied in Determining Reasonableness of
Ordinance
The generally accepted test as to the constitutionality of an exercise
of the police power' is whether under all the existing conditions and
surrounding circumstances it is reasonable ;2 i.e., it must be reasonably
adapted to accomplish a legitimate end,3 be reasonable toward persons
whom it affects, 4 must not be for the annoyance of a particular class, 5
nor be unduly oppressive. 6 Reasonableness is a question of law for the
=' United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
=
United States v. Gallagher, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 506, 22 C.M.R. 296 (1957).
u8 Wheeler
v. Reynolds, 164 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Fla. 1958).
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
United States ex rel. Guagliardo v. McElroy, 158 F. Supp. 171 (D.D.C.
1958) ; it re Varney's Petition, 141 F. Supp. 190 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
" Grisham v. Taylor, 161 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Pa. 1958).
"Police power, although elusive of definition, has been defined as "the power
inherent in every sovereignty to govern men and things, under which power the
legislature may, within constitutional limits, not only prohibit all things hurtful
to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society, but may prescribe regulations to
promote the public health, morals, and safety, and add to the general public
convenience, prosperity, and welfare." 11 Am. JuR., Constitutional Law § 247
(1937).
' Austin v. Shaw, 235 N.C. 722, 71 S.E.2d 25 (1952); Berger v. Smith, 156
N.C. 323, 72 S.E. 376 (1911). It has been suggested, however, that an exercise
of the police power may be reasonable and yet unconstitutional. Soref, The
Doctrine of Reasonableness in the Pblice Power, 15 MA Q. L. Rzv. 3 (1930).
"It is necessary . . . that the proposed restriction have a reasonable and
substantial relation to the evil it purports to remedy." State v. Harris, 216 N.C.
746, 759, 6 S.E.2d 854, 863 (1940). See also East Side Levee and Sanitary Dist. v.
East St. Louis & C. Ry., 279 Ill. 123, 116 N.E. 720 (1917) ; Victory Cab Co. v.
Shaw, 232 N.C. 138, 59 S.E.2d 573 (1950).
'East Side Levee & Sanitary Dist. v. East St. Louis & C. Ry., supra note 3;
State v. Bass, 171 N.C. 780, 87 S.E. 972 (1916).
'Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) ; Town of Clinton v. Standard Oil Co.,
193 N.C. 432, 137 S.E. 183 (1927).
' Plessy v. Ferguson, supra note 5.
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court,7 and is said to be based on human judgment, natural justice, and
common sense in view of all the facts and circumstances."
The application of the police power may vary as social, economic, and political
needs change ;9 therefore, what was once a proper exercise of such power
may later become arbitrary and unreasonable as a result of changed
conditions and circumstances. 10
Winston-Salem v. Southern Ry.11 is a recent North Carolina decision wherein the foregoing principles were applied. In this case 12it
appeared that the plaintiff had been given power by its city charter
to require any railroad company "at its own expense, to construct,
maintain and repair . . . crossings at grade, over or under its
streets . . . ."' Pursuant to this power, the Board of Aldermen of

Winston-Salem enacted an ordinance' 4 requiring the defendant to rebuild, at its entire expense, an existing trestle over a municipal street
so as to accommodate a proposed intracity thoroughfare which was to
cross the street under the trestle. Writ of mandamus' 5 was requested to
enforce the ordinance.
Defendant challenged the provisions of both the charter and the
ordinance on the ground that they were arbitrary, unreasonable, and
unconstitutional, and contended, inter alia, that the instant case was
factually distinguishable from the numerous cases cited by the plaintiff
v. Southern Ry., 185 N.C. 240, 117 S.E. 17 (1923).
'Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193, 116 N.W. 885 (1908).
1 Elizabeth City v. Aydlett, 201 N.C. 602, 161 S.E. 78 (1931) (police power
expands) ; State v. Lockey, 198 N.C. 551, 152 S.E. 693 (1930) ("The police power
is elastic, stretching out to meet the progress of the age.")
"It is more accurate to say, however, that the power itself remains the same,
and that its apparent extension is only the application of the principle on which
it is based to new conditions as they arise." State ex rel. Short v. Reidall, 109
Okla. 35, 39, 233 Pac. 684, 687 (1924) ; accord, Schmidt v. Board of Adjustment,
9 N.J. 405, 88 A.2d 607 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
" Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935) ("A statute valid
as to one set of facts may be invalid as to another.") ; Abie State Bank v. Bryan,
282 U.S. 765 (1931) (assessments under bank guaranty law); Chastleton Corp.
v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924) (post war rent controls) ; Atlantic Coast Line R.R.
v. Ivey, 148 Fla. 680, 5 So. 2d 244 (1941) (statute making railroads absolutely
liable for injury to livestock on unfenced track, and no such liability put on motor
vehicles) ; Realty Revenue Corp. v. Wilson, 181 Misc. 802, 44 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup.
Ct. 1943) (order requiring sprinkler systems in multiple dwellings held invalid
where material not obtainable due to war). See also Note, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 780
(1955).
Likewise, a once improper regulation may later become proper. Miller v.
Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381 (1925) (zoning laws) ; Elizabeth
City v. Aydlett, 201 N.C. 602, 161 S.E. 78 (1931) (zoning laws). For this
reason a few jurisdictions state that stare decisis has no application to the exercise
of police power. Schmitt v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co., 187 Ind. 623, 120 N.E.
19 (1918) ; State ex rel. George v. Aiken, 42 S.C. 222, 20 S.E. 221 (1894).
11248 N.C. 637, 105 S.E.2d 37 (1958).
1 The General Assembly may delegate to a municipality a quantum of the
state's sovereign police power. Brewer v. Valk, 204 N.C. 186, 167 S.E. 638 (1933).
" N.C. Private Laws 1927, c. 232, § 54.
' Adopted April 15, 1957.
'Durham

"As to mandamus being the proper remedy, see 2 ELLIOTT, RAILROADS § 1013

(4th ed. 1926), and cases there cited.
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in which similar statutes and ordinances were upheld. 16 In support of
its position, defendant introduced into evidence special facts 1 7 tending
to show changed economic conditions unfavorable to the railroads. The
trial court, without reference to these special facts, granted mandamus.' 8
On appeal the supreme court reversed, holding that the ordinance (also
the provision of the charter) was unconstitutional, as applied to the
facts of the case, in that it was an unreasonable exercise of the police
power, depriving the defendant of its property without due process of
law in violation of the Constitution of North Carolina.' 9

" Where an ordinance, in the interest of public safety, convenience, or welfare,
requires the railroad to construct or reconstruct passageways over or above
streets and highways, whether existing at the time such passageway is constructed
or not, the majority view is that such an ordinance is valid as a reasonable exercise
of the police power. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Public Util. Comm'n,
346 U.S. 346 (1953); Erie R.R. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 254 U.S. 394
(1921) ; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minneapolis, 232 U.S. 430 (1914) ;
Cincinnati, I. & W. Ry. v. City of Connersville, 218 U.S. 336 (1910). The theory
of these cases is that the public has a superior right to the safe and unimpeded
use of the streets and highways, that the railroad is obstructing such use, and that
the cost to the railroad is damnumn absque injuria, or deemed to be compensated
by the public benefit which the company is supposed to share. Erie R.R. v. Board
of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, supra; Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Omaha, 235 U.S. 121 (1914).
The great weight of authority refuses to recognize any distinction, as pertains
to railroad liability, between streets laid out previous to or subsequent to the
existence of the railroad track. 44 Am. JUR., Railroads § 297 (1942), and cases
there cited.
It is interesting to note that in State v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R., 74 N.C.
143 (1876), the railroad was not required to repair a bridge where such repairs
were made necessary by roads laid out subsequent to the existence of the railroad.
An opposite result was reached in Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Goldsboro, 155 N.C.
356, 71 S.E. 514 (1911), aff'd, 232 U.S. 548 (1914). Though it might be argued
that these variant decisions rest on differences in the respective charters, the
Goldsboro case, supra, quotes with approval the majority theory as found in
State ex rel. Minneapolis v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., 98 Minn. 380, 108 N.W. 261,
(1906), aff'd inem. 214 U.S. 497 (1909), viz., "A railroad . . . accepts . . . its
franchise subject to the implied right of the state to lay out and open new
streets and highways over its tracks, and must be deemed, as a matter of law, to
have had in contemplation at the time its charter was granted, and is bound to
assume, all burdens incident to new, as well as existing, crossings."
The principal case seems passively to accept the majority view.
"' The special facts are, in essence, the following:
(1) Large-scale competition from trucks and public carriers has resulted in
economic hardship for railroads, and costs of trestle improvements cannot be
passed to the public by higher freight rates.
(2) The City of Winston-Salem has at its disposal, for street improvements.
over $500,000 yearly, obtained from ad valorunt taxes on motor vehicles and
from gasoline taxes.
(3) Benefit of trestle construction no longer goes to railroads through creation
of "feeders" which bring business to the railroads, but rather, the benefit goes
to the railroads' competitors.
(4) There is a growing legislative trend toward relieving the railroads of
some or all of such costs.
" Mandamus was issued July 24, 1957, by Resident Judge Walter E. Johnston,
Jr., who found as fact that "the trestle of the defendant as now located constitutes
an unreasonable and dangerous interference with and will endanger and impede
and obstruct traffic on [the proposed street] . . . and constitutes a danger to the
traveling nublic for the City of Winston-Salem." Transcript of Record, p. 179,
Winston-Salem v. Southern Ry., 248 N.C. 637, 105 S.E.2d 37 (1958).
" N.C. CorsT. art. I, § 17.
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In the principal case, the court noted a lack of evidence that the
present underpass was dangerous to existing traffic at the underpass,
and in that respect distinguished it from cases based primarily on the
safety factor.20 It is admitted by the court that when the proposed
street is built it will have to narrow considerably in order to pass through
the existing trestle, and that in fact a hazardous situation will result at
this bottleneck. The court disposes of this rather summarily, however,
with the statement that "this situation of possible danger would be
entirely of the City's making in its attempt to eliminate traffic congestion,
originating principally in other areas of the City . . . ." (Emphasis
added.)21 The implication from such language is that the railroad
would not be held liable for the cost, even in the event that a hazardous
bottleneck subsequently occurs, so long as the situation is caused by
factors unconnected with the location and operation of the railroad.
The soundness of this implication should be considered in connection
with the three cases which follow.
In State ex rel. Minneapolis v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., 2 2 a somewhat
novel situation arose when the city constructed, at its own expense, a
new street and trestle through the railroad's embankment. The street
was designed as a thoroughfare (as in the principal case) manifestly to
aid the flow of traffic in other parts of the city. The trestle subsequently
burned and the city directed the railway, at its entire expense, to build
a new trestle. The court, in an elaborate decision, upheld the city's
2

power.
In Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Goldsboro,24 streets were laid out

subsequent to the existence of railroad tracks. The town graded the
streets parallel to the tracks, leaving the tracks six to eighteen inches
higher than the streets. The court upheld an ordinance requiring the
20 See, e.g., Durham v. Southern Ry., 185 N.C. 240, 117 S.E. 17
(1923), in
which mandamus was granted to enforce an ordinance requiring the railway to
separate a grade crossing and construct a street underpass at its entire expense
of $250,000, where the tracks were crossed by thousands of pedestrians and
motorists every day, several accidents had occured, and where traffic was obstructed
by trains and switching engines. Likewise, in Shreveport v. Kansas City, S. & G.
Ry., 167 La. 771, 120 So. 290 (1929), where the street underpass originally served
street traffic and one street car track; twenty years later there were two street
car tracks and barely room for two lanes of motorist traffic; the city's population
had doubled; and the underpass was a hazard, the railway was forced to rebuild
the underpass at its entire expense of $43,000.
21248 N.C. at 650, 105 S.E.2d at 46.
2298 Minn. 380, 108 N.W. 261 (1906), aff'd nem., 214 U.S. 497 (1909).
22 The underpass was said to be analogous to a grade crossing safety device,
the only difference being one of relative cost, and not of principle.
Quaere: Assuming that the city under its charter has power to require railroads to construct safety devices at crossings of new roads, could not the court
in the principal case have decided in favor of the city on the basis of this analogy?
Would the hesitance to accept such an analogy indicate that the objection was
one of principle, or of extra cost?
2,155 N.C. 356, 71 S.E. 514 (1911), aff'd, 232 U.S.'548 (1914).
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railroad, at its entire expense, to lower the tracks in the interest of
public safety and convenience.
25
In Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Public Util. Comn'n,
the railroad, in 1914, constructed two adjoining street underpasses, the
principal uses of which were to give access to a garbage disposal plant.
The City of Los Angeles, in order to alleviate traffic conditions in other
parts of the city, subsequently (in the late 1940's) built a main thoroughfare boulevard sixty feet wide which narrowed to twenty feet at the
underpasses, thereby causing a bottleneck. The Utilities Commission,
empowered by statute to allocate costs, required the railroad to pay
fifty per cent of the cost of reconstructing the underpasses. In affirming
the allocation, the United States Supreme Court said: "[T]he improvements were instituted ...

to meet local transportation needs and further

safety and convenience, made necessary by the rapid growth of the
communities. In such circumstances, this Court has consistently held
that in the exercise of the police power, the cost . . . may be allocated
all to the railroads ....

There is the proper limitation that such alloca-

26
tion of costs must be fair and reasonable."
In each of the latter three cases the railroad was held liable for at least
a proportionate part of the expense, notwithstanding that the hazards
and inconveniences were "entirely of the City's making."
Having ruled that public danger, either existing or prospective (as
a result of a probable bottleneck), has no bearing on this case, the court
states that this case is one of public convenience, designed to relieve
traffic congestion in other parts of the city; that where the location of
the railroad is not a reasonably related causative factor in producing
the inconvenience sought to be remedied, the railroad cannot be held
liable for the entire expense. The court would seem to restrict the
railroad's liability for public inconvenience to cases of traffic congestion
27
caused by the location of a particular grade crossing.
It is important to note that there are cases of public convenience in
which no traffic congestion-indeed, no traffic--existed prior to the
construction of an underpass or overpass. These cases should be
compared to the principal case in that respect.
In Cincinnati,I. & W. Ry. v.City of Connersville,28 the city extended
28
"'346 U.S. 346 (1953).
Id.at 352.

"'For example, in one of the consolidated cases of Atchison, Topeka, & Santa
Fe Ry. v. Public Util. Conm'6, a grade crossing, often blocked by trains, caused a
considerable backlash of traffic; no danger was involved. The Court upheld the
commission order requiring the railroad to pay almost $750,000 (half of the total
cost) to construct an underpass so as to alleviate the inconvenience. Likewise,
in State ex tel. Wabash Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 340 Mo. 225, 100 S.W.2d
522 (1936), the railroad was required to build an underpass, since the existing
grade crossing was causing delay, congestion, and general inconvenience to motorists
and pedestrians in a public park.
2 218 U.S. 336 (1910).
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its city limits to include the railroad tracks, then constructed a new
street up to the railroad embankment and required the railroad to
provide, at its own expense, an underpass for the new street. The
United States Supreme Court upheld the action of the city.
In a later United States Supreme Court decision, Chicago, Milwaukee
& St. Paul Ry. v. Minneapolis,29 the railroad tracks were situated between two lakes used for recreation. The City of Minneapolis proposed
to connect the two lakes by means of a canal in order that pleasure boats
could pass from one lake to the other. The Court held that no constitutional rights of the railroad had been violated by virtue of its being
required to build a bridge over the canal, at its entire expense, for the
convenience of passing boats. 80
It is submitted that the principal case cannot be distinguished from
cases cited in support of the plaintiff on the ground that the location of
the existing trestle does not cause public inconvenience; nor does the
court purport to distinguish the present case on such ground. Rather,
the court states: "The uncontroverted special facts shown in evidence
or of which the courts may take judicial notice, as herein pointed out,3 '
disclose changed economic conditions bearing favorably on the financial
condition of the City but unfavorably on that of the railway company,
and factually distinguish the instant case from the decisions cited by the
City and take the case out of the principles relied upon by it as authority
to sustain the validity of its ordinance.

' 2
S

Fifty years ago, trestle costs were not unfairly imposed on the railroads, since in most cases they benefited directly by a reduction in tort
claims through the elimination of dangerous grade crossings, 88 or indirectly in that new roads acted as "feeders," transporting business to
and from the railroad.8 4 Even in cases where no benefit can be found, 8
there was no burden on the railroad, since the costs were easily passed
on to the ultimate consumers of rail-carried goods.
29 232 U.S. 430 (1914).
" The Court reiterated the rule set out in the Connersville case, stating: "It is
well settled that railroad corporations may be required, at their own expense,
not only to abolish existing grade crossings but also to build and maintain suitable
bridges or viaducts to carry highways, newly laid out, over their tracks ...
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 438.
For the theory behind the holdings of the Connersville and Minneapolis cases,
see note 16, supra.
Note that the street underpass now in dispute in the principal case was
constructed by the railway in 1923, at its entire expense, pursuant to a resolution
by the city in order to make way for the new city street constructed up to the
railway's embankment; the railway apparently never questioned the fact that
such was its duty.
" See note 17 mupra.
32 248 N.C. at 655, 105 S.E.2d at 50.
" See, e.g., Erie R.R. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 254 U.S. 394 (1921).
:'See,
e.g., Cincinnati, I. & W. Ry. v. City of Connersville, 218 U.S. 336 (1910).
5
See, e.g., .Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minneapolis, 232 U.S. 430
(1914).
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Today the imposition of such costs is not always so fair and justifiable.
New streets which were once "feeders" for the benefit of the railroads
are now avenues of convenience for the benefit of the railroads' competitors-the trucks and public carriers. Costs which once could be
passed to the public in the form of higher shipping rates must now be
absorbed by the railroads, since to raise rates would mean loss of business to competitors.
It would seem that the North Carolina court is the first to apply the
dictum of Justice Brandeis, in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters,386
which judicially recognizes the significance of the changing economic
position of the railroads brought about by increased competition.
Municipalities should take notice of the implications of the principal
case-that fairness of allocation of trestle construction costs on the railroad will in large part be determined by the present economic and
competitive positions of the railroads, including the relative economic
status of the railroad and municipality. Economic position, benefit 37 or
detriment, local necessity for the construction, and purpose of the construction-all must be considered as factors in determining the reasonableness and fairness of the cost imposition. Apparently, then, municipalities will find little solace in precedent decisions which ignore such
38
considerations.
Louis J. FISHER III
'e 294 U.S. 405 (1935).
The Tennessee Supreme Court was held in error for
ruling that a police regulation requiring the railroad to pay 50% of the costs of
a new underpass was valid on its face, and that evidence of changed conditions
could not be admitted. The United States Supreme Court did not say that the
excluded evidence showed that the regulation was arbitrary or unreasonable, but only
that the evidence of changed conditions should be examined as possibly affecting
the reasonableness of the regulation. The excluded evidence showed that the
underpass proposed was not necessary nor requested by the rural community
of 1,823 inhabitants using the crossing; that the proposed highway was a link in
the federal interstate system which would manifestly further the convenience of
motor carriers in competition with the railrpad. Justices Stone arid Cardozo
dissented on the ground that even in view of all these facts the regulation could not
be held to be arbitrary or unreasonable.
For discussions-of the Nashville case, see Notes, 13 N.C.L. Rav. 491 (1935)
(predicting changes in railroad law), 23 CA-. L. REv. 631 (1935), 13 CHI.-KE-NT
L. REv.262 (1935), 44 YAmL L.J. 1259 (1935).
Recognition of the change in economics and competition as discussed in the
Nashville case is found in dictum of Austin v. Shaw, 235 N.C. 722, 71 S.E.2d
25 (1952).
"' The principal case does not go so far as to hold that fairness depends solely
on benefit derived, though defendant sought this result. This theory was expressly
negated in the recent United States Supreme Court case of Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 346 U.S. 346 (1953).
88 Although the decision of the principal case was particularly favorable to the
railroads, it must not be assumed that the court protected the interest of railroads
at the expense of the public interest; it is more probable that the court recognized
that the best interest of the public lies in preventing the too-rapid decline of the
railroad industry.
As to the railroads' decline and effect on national economy and defense, see
25 ICC PRac. J. 836 (1958).
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Constitutional Law-President's Power to Remove Non-Executive
Officeholder
The War Claims Commission was established' to adjudicate claims
for compensating internees, prisoners of war, and religious organizations
who suffered personal injury or property damage at the hands of hostile governments during World War II. The creating statute2 contained no provision for removal of members of the Commission by the
President. Myron Wiener was appointed to the Commission by President Truman and removed by President Eisenhower who wanted it
staffed with personnel of his own selection. Wiener brought an action
in the Court of Claims to recover the salary he would have received
from the date of his removal until the dissolution of the Commission
alleging that the President had no authority to remove him. The
Court of Claims dismissed the action stating that absent express congressional limitation the President has power to remove an official who
exercises quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative functions.8 The Supreme
Court reversed 4 on the ground that no removal power exists unless it
could fairly be said that Congress had conferred such power on the
President.
The controversy surrounding the scope of the President's power of
removal has a history dating back to the first Congress. The Supreme
Court was first called on to decide whether or not Congress could limit
this power in the case of Myers v. United States.6 Myers had been appointed a first class postmaster for a term of four years pursuant to an
act of Congress which provided for his removal "by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate."17 Even though the President had not
consulted the Senate, the Supreme Court sanctioned his action in removing Myers on the ground that the removal was an executive act
which Congress could not appropriate by requiring its advice and consent. The Court went on to state by way of dictum that the President's
illimitable power of removal extended to administrative officers perform8
ing quasi-judicial as well as executive functions.

In 1935, in the case of Humphrey's Executor v. United States,0 the
Supreme Court once again was called on to decide if Congress could
limit the President's power to remove officers appointed with the advice
1
War Claims Act, 1948, 62 STAT. 1240, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 2001-16 (Supp. 1958).
2
Ibid.
'Wiener v. United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 827, 142 F. Supp. 910 (1956).
'Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
'Id. at 351. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), for a review of
this history.
6272 U.S. 52 (1926).
719 STAT. 80 (1876), 39 U.S.C. § 31 (1952).
'Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926).
'295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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and consent of the Senate. Humphrey had been appointed to the
Federal Trade Commission pursuant to a statute which provided in part
that "any commissioner may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."' 1 President Roosevelt
removed him on the ground "that the aims and purposes of the Administration with respect to the work of the Commission can be carried out
most effectively with personnel of my own selection."" After Humphrey's death his executor brought an action in the Court of Claims
to recover his salary as a Federal Trade Commissioner from the time
of his removal until his death. The Court of Claims certified two questions 12 to the Supreme Court: 1) whether the Federal Trade Commission
Act in providing for removal of commissioners for specified causes limited
the President's removal power to the causes enumerated, and, 2) if so,
whether such limitation was constitutional. The Court answered both
questions affirmatively.
In resolving the first interrogatory the Court could point to no
provision in the statute expressly stating that Congress intended to so
limit the President's removal power. As a result the Court, apparently
conceding that such power exists,1 3 was obliged to infer what Congress

intended in this matter. In doing so the Court found that "the fixing of
a definite term subject to removal for cause, unless there be some counter
vailing provision or circumstance indicating the contrary .

.

. is enough

to establish the legislative intent that the term is not to be curtailed in
the absence of such cause."' 14 While this finding would have sufficed
to dispose of the first question, the Court also concluded that this intent
was "made clear by a consideration of the character of the commission
and the legislative history which accompanied and preceded the passage
of the act."' 5
In answering the second question the Court rejected the dictum in
the Myers case' 6 and distinguished that case on the ground that the
office of postmaster is merely a unit of the executive branch and hence
inherently subject to the President's power of removal, whereas a
10 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1952).

21295 U.S. at 618.
2 Id. at 619.
13 That the power of removal is an incident to the power of appointment is a
principle of longstanding recognition. Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230
(1839).
" 295 U.S. at 623. In finding a congressional intent to restrict the President's
power of removal the Court was confronted with a prior decision, Shurtleff v. United
States, 189 U.S. 311 (1903), where it was held that a statute should not be
construed as limiting this power in the absence of plain and unambiguous language.
That case was distinguished, however, on the ground that the statute under which
Shurtleff was appointed provided no term of office so that a denial of the President's
removal power would have given him the right to tenure for life or until found
guilty of some act specified in the statute.
" Id. at 624.
26 Id. at 631-32.
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Federal Trade Commissioner's duties are quasi-judicial and quasi-legisla17
tive which must be performed free from executive influence and control.
The basis of this distinction rests on the fundamental doctrine of the
separation of powers between the three branches of the federal government.' 8 Thus, after Humphrey's, the law seems to have been that with
respect to officials charged with purely executive duties the President's
power of removal is illimitable, but where an appointee's work is quasijudicial or quasi-legislative Congress can limit the President's power of
removal. 19
The principal case lends itself to two possible interpretations: (1)
that the President has complete power to remove members of quasijudicial or quasi-legislative bodies (hereafter referred to as independent
agencies) except where limited by Congress; or (2) that the President
has no power to remove members of such bodies except where conferred
by Congress. The first interpretation arises out of the Court's approach to
the problem. Just as in the Humphrey's case, the Court seems to have
concerned itself with whether or not Congress intended to limit the
President's power of removal. This approach, from which a tacit
admission that such power exists might be inferred, 20 is made manifest
by the fact that the Court looked to the history of the act creating the
War Claims Commission, failure of congressional explicitness, and tenure
-found in the relatively short life expectancy of the Commission-and
concluded that "Congress did not wish to have hang over the Commission the Damocles' sword of removal by the President." 21 Because of
the striking resemblance between the Court's approaches in the two
cases, both might very well be interpreted as standing for the same
proposition.
Viewed in this light, however, the Wiener decision represents a
broadening of the doctrine of the Humphrey's case, for in Wiener there
were fewer factors indicating a congressional intention to restrict the
President's power of removal. One of the two factors, causes for
removal, which the Court in the latter case indicated would be sufficient
to establish the requisite legislative intent, was conspicuously missing
from the instant case. The remaining factor, tenure of office, was sup:1 Id.at 627-28.
'8 Id. at 629-30.
19 The Humphrey's case left for future judicial determination cases falling
within the field of doubt between it and the Myers case. One such case arose in
1940, Morgan v. TVA, 115 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1940). The President removed
Morgan from the board of directors of TVA but not pursuant to the statute which
provided for the removal by the President of any member of the board who made
appointments on the basis of anything other than merit and efficiency. Morgan's
duties were found to be predominantly executive and his removal was upheld.
" However, the Court might obviate this inference by attributing this approach

to an attempt on its part to ascertain whether or not Congress had conferred
removal power on the President.
2Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958).
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plied by the Court's finding of tenure in the relatively short period during
which the War Claims Commission was to operate.22 Moreover, the
legislative history of the act less convincingly demonstrated Congress'
intent. The Court was able to point to but a single act on the part of
Congress evincing its intent. The House Bill placed the administration
of the Commission in the hands of the Federal Security Administrator,
an arm of the Executive. The Senate rewrote the bill to establish a
Commission "with jurisdiction to receive and adjudicate [claims] according to law."'
While this interpretation of the decision would not be a declaration
of total separation of powers in the area involving independent agencies
created by Congress, it would seem to represent a stride in that direction. Conceivably, separation may eventually be achieved through
erosion, on a case by case basis, of the factors relied upon by the Court
in the Humphrey's case in arriving at Congress' intent.
Perhaps the more reasonable interpretation to ascribe to the principal
case is the second one which arises out of the Court's discussion of
Humphrey's. It cited Humphrey's as having drawn a sharp line of
cleavage between officials of the Executive Department and officials of
independent agencies, and apparently regarded that case as standing for
the proposition that the President's power to remove officials of these
agencies "exists only if Congress may fairly be said to have conferred
it." 2 4

[Emphasis added.]

This latter interpretation would enable the courts to dispose of
contested removals such as the one presented in the principal case by
simply ascertaining two things: (1) that the President had removed a
member of an independent agency, and (2) that Congress could not fairly
be said to have conferred upon him the power to make such removal.
Having found these two things it would follow that the removal was
invalid. Viewed in this light the principal case represents a very considerable extension of the Humphrey's case and effects a total separation
of powers in the area of the President's power to remove members of
independent agencies. It has the desirable effects of placing both Congress and the President on notice as to where each stands on the matter
of removal and of clarifying the confusion which apparently still exists
in this area. In addition, it would greatly curtail employment of the
spoils system, withdraw the ominous "Damocles' sword of removal"
from over independent agencies, encourage more selective appointments,
and conduce to a more efficient and impartial performance of an agency's
functions. These things in turn would facilitate the creation of a group
352.
Id. at 354.
Id. at 353. Although the principal case did not mention it, the Shurtleff case
would seem to be nullified by this interpretation. See note 15 supra.
22 Id. at
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of experts ready to exercise their trained judgments on the multitude
of complex problems constantly brought before them. Thus, assuming
that there should be a separation of powers, the decision in the principal
case seems to be desirable regardless of which interpretation is placed
on it. Under the first interpretation the decision represents a stride
toward separation; under the second, total separation is achieved.

JOHN R. INGLE
Corporations-Non-Profit Corporations Engaging in Commercial
Enterprises
The doctrine of ultra vires in general corporation law has undergone
considerable statutory revision in recent years.1 The scope of this Note
is to survey briefly the application of this doctrine to the narrower field
of non-profit corporations, as such application appears in the comparative
paucity of case law.
In the recent Georgia case of Church of God of the Union Assembly
v. Carmical,2 the defendant church, incorporated generally to promote
the interests of religion, was engaging in the auction business in competition with plaintiff auctioneer. The court denied an injunction against
the church's conducting the business, holding that the plaintiff lacked
sufficient interest to complain about the alleged ultra vires act. The
point was made that the court was conceding, not holding, that the
business activity was ultra vires. While this case does not reach the
question of whether a non-profit corporation may or may not operate
a business for profit, it serves to point up the problem inherent in
considering the powers which may be exercised by this class of corporate
entities.
Generally speaking, the problem of whether to allow or enjoin
business activity by a non-profit corporation has presented itself to the
courts in three situations: (1) where such activity is expressly prohibited by the corporation's charter; (2) where it is not contemplated
by the charter; and (3) where it is provided for in the charter, but such
a provision is beyond statutory authorization.
In State ex rel. v. Southern Junior College,3 there was an express
provision in the charter that the corporation should not possess the
power to engage in any kind of trading operation. In an action brought
by the state on relation of citizens engaged in the printing business, it
was held that the prohibitory clause prevented the college from operating
I BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 108 (Rev. ed. 1946). For a typical statement
of the ultra vires rule as it is found in modern statutes, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-18
(Supp. 1957).
2 104 S.E.2d 912 (Ga. 1958).
' 166 Tenn. 535, 64 S.W.2d 9 (1933).
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its printshop commercially, even though the profits derived from the
operation were applied to the general educational purposes of the school.
An early Georgia case 4 is illustrative of the second situation. The
church there chartered a steamboat for an excursion to raise funds to
pay off the indebtedness incurred in erecting a new church building.
The defense of ultra vires was upheld against the church's suit to recover for the loss of profits resulting from the failure to make the trip.
The court thought this activity was an attempt by the church to conduct
a day's carrying business with the public, a venture not contemplated
in the objects of association. However, a contrary result was reached
by an Ohio court 5 where the permitted business activity was selling
particular merchandise to its members for a profit which was properly
used to defray the non-profit corporation's expenses.
That a non-profit corporation cannot assure itself of the power to
invade the business world by simply including that power in its charter
is pointed out by the cases in the third category. On much the same
facts presented by the Southern Junior College case, the Tennessee
court two years later again enjoined a publishing enterprise by a nonprofit corporation. 6 But instead of prohibiting this activity, the charter
in the latter case expressly authorized it. The court held that the
operation did not come within the purview of any of the authorized
objectives set out in the controlling statute, 7 pointing to a statutory
prohibition 8 against such corporations engaging in trading operations.
In State ex rel. Dade County Kennel Club, Inc. v. State Racing
Comm'n,9 a kennel club organized for charitable and benevolent purposes
was refused a permit to operate a racetrack, even though the power to
build and operate greyhound racing tracks was expressly granted by
the club's approved charter. The proposed act was declared contrary to
the statute 0 authorizing non-profit incorporation.
Apparently there are no North Carolina decisions in point. But
there is no reason to believe that our court would hold differently from
other courts; i.e., when called upon in a proper proceeding, it would
probably enjoin a corporation organized for non-profit purposes from
engaging in purely commercial enterprises in competition with business
' Harriman v. First Bryan Baptist Church, 63 Ga. 186 (1879).
' State ex rel. Bartlett v. National Ass'n of Angling and Casting Clubs, 72
Ohio App. 319, 51 N.E.2d 662 (1943). Accord, Emrick v. Pennsylvania R.R.
YMCA, 69 Ohio App. 353, 43 N.E.2d 733 (1942) (operating restaurant) and
Eads v. YWCA, 325 Mo. 577, 29 S.W.2d 701 (1930) (renting building).
8 State ex rel. v. Southern Publishing Ass'n, 169 Tenn. 257, 84 S.W.2d 580
(1935). For a discussion of the power of religious, educational or charitable
corporations to engage in business for profit, see Annot., 100 A.L.R. 579 (1936).
TEN. CODE ANN. § 48-1101 (1955).
8
TLEN. CODE ANN.
10116 Fla. 144, 156
FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 48-1109 (1955).

So. 343 (1934).
§ 617.01 (1956).
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organizations or individuals. It seems worthy of comment, however,
that an express prohibition against engaging in trading operations does
not appear in our new Non-Profit Corporation Act."
The North Carolina act provides that non-profit corporations may
be formed for any lawful purpose;12 and in order to carry out the
purposes stated in the charter, the power is given to "acquire, own, hold,
improve, use and otherwise deal in and with, real or personal property."' 18
There is a general grant of all powers necessary or convenient to effect
the corporation's purposes,' 4 plus freedom of charter amendment so long
as the charter as amended contains only provisions lawful under the
chapter. 5 The authority to assert lack of power to act is given to the
Attorney General in an action to dissolve the corporation or to enjoin
it from transacting unauthorized business.' 8
In conclusion, it appears that the trend toward liberalization of the
ultra vires doctrine as regards business corporations 17 has been carried
over to the non-profit field to a large extent. Perhaps excursions into
the commercial world which are flagrant departures from the purposes
of the corporation will continue to be enjoined; but, at the same time,
it would seem to be growing easier to bring business operations within
the protective veil of things incidental to the non-profit objectives stated
in the charter. The business corporation and private merchant may
well look with disfavor at the type of competition presented by these
"non-profit" corporations.
HAROLD L. WATERS

Criminal Law-Forgery-Use of Fictitious Name
In Hubsch v. United States,' a recent decision from the Fifth Circuit,
the defendant was indicted under the National Stolen Property Act2 on
"1N.C. GEN. STAT., ch. 55A (Supp. 1957). Although not specifically mentioned
in the case, such a prohibition is set out in the Georgia statute under which the
church
in the principal case was incorporated. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-401 (1935).
'2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-5 (Supp. 1957).
(Supp. 1957).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-15(b) (1)
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-15(b) (8) (Supp. 1957).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-34 (Supp. 1957).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-17(3) (Supp. 1957).
BALLANTINE, op. cit. Smpra note 1.
1256 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1958).
1

'
7

48 STAT. 794 (1934) (later codified as 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311, 2314-15 (1952 and
Supp. IV 1957)). The portion of § 2314 under which defendant was indicted provides in pertinent part as follows:

Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, transports in interstate or

foreign commerce any falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities,
knowing the same to have been falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited
[shall be punished].
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two counts of causing3 falsely made and forged 4 checks to be transported
in interstate commerce, knowing the same to have been falsely made and
forged.
As to the first count, the following facts were found: the defendant
received treatment at a hospital, representing himself to be "Alfred
Weinstein"-in fact, a fictitious person; in payment for the treatment,
the defendant gave a check signed "A. A. Weinstein" and drawn on a
bank in another state; the check was returned by the bank with the
notation "unable to locate." The court held that these facts were
insufficient to constitute forgery, as required under the act, 5 and therefore
that the defendant should be acquitted as to this count.0
With regard to the second count, these facts appeared: the defendant
selected for purchase a Masonic ring at a jewelry store and asked the
jeweler if he could pay for the ring by check; the jeweler replied that
he could do so if he had the proper credentials; the defendant then told
the jeweler that he was a Mason and a Shriner and produced from a
billfold several Masonic cards from Atlanta with the name "Weinstein"
thereon; the jeweler then accepted from the defendant a check in payment
for the ring, with the name "Weinstein" as drawer; this check was also
returned by the out-of-state bank on which it was drawn with the
notation "unable to locate." As to this count, the court seemed to think
the trier of facts might find that the defendant "created a fictional personality of Weinstein, the Mason who desired to purchase the Masonic
ring, and on the faith and credit of a check purporting to be that of
Weinstein the Mason the check was accepted. ' 7 If it were so found,
the court concluded, it would show reliance upon the signature rather
than on the person of the defendant, and a forgery would have been
committed.
That a person may commit forgery by executing an instrument in a
fictitious name is well settled.8 The problem arises in determining under
what circumstances the signing of an assumed or fictitious name to an
One who causes the prohibited transportation is punishable as a principal
under §2314 by virtue of 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1952). Pereira v. United States, 347

U.S. 1 (1953).

' Forgery may be defined as "the fraudulent making of a false writing having
apparent legal significance." PERxiCs, CamiNAL LAw 291 (1957). The requisites of the offense are (1) a false writing (2) falsely made with intent to defraud and (3) of such a nature that it is a possible subject of forgery, i.e., it
must appear on its face to be a valid instrument. Id. at 292.
1 The courts generally interpret the language of § 2314 quoted in note 2 as
merely importing the common law of forgery. See, e.g., Wright v. United States,
172 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1949) ; Greathouse v. United States, 170 F.2d 512 (4th Cir.
1948). But see Pines v. United States, 123 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1941).
' Although this conduct would almost certainly he punishable either under state
false pretenses or worthless check statutes, federal jurisdiction to prosecute under
§ 2314 would be defeated.
Hubsch v. United States, 256 F.2d 820, 824 (5th Cir. 1958).
82 WHARToN, CRImiNAL LAW AND PRocEDuRE § 630 (Anderson ed. 1957).
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instrument is sufficient to constitute the crime. This Note will be
limited to a discussion of the problem as it has arisen in some of the
leading cases which have been decided under the National Stolen Proper10
ty Act.
INSTRUMENT EXECUTED IN FICTITIOUS NAME AND PRESENTED AS

If one executes an instrument in his own name and passes
it off as his own instrument, he is not guilty of forgery.11 Likewise if
one executes an instrument by signing his assumed name and passes
it off as his own instrument, it is not a forgery. 12 This rule is illustrated
by United States v. Greever.'s
In that case the defendant was charged with a violation of the
National Stolen Property Act. 14 The facts were stipulated: defendant
signed various fictitious names to several checks drawn on a Rhode
Island bank 5 in the presence of the several payees, each of whom knew
the defendant by the particular name signed on the check; the bank had
no account in the name of the defendant or the fictitious drawers; the
defendant represented in each case that he was the person whose signature appeared on the check and did not represent that the signatures were
of anyone other than himself. The court held that the defendant should
be acquitted.
ONE'S OWN.

INSTRUMENT EXECUTED IN NAME OF FICTITIOUS COMPANY BY ONE

IN HIS TRUE NAME. A person may draw a check in the name of a
fictitious company without being guilty of forgery if he signs his own

name along with that of the fictitious company, and the person cashing
Such were the facts in the leading
the check knows him by that name.'
case of Greathouse v. United States.17 There the defendant signed
' Some decisions have held that the forgery is complete where a fictitious name
is used, with intent to defraud, and the instrument is capable of being used to the
prejudice of another-the so-called "broad rule." State v. Wheeler, 20 Ore. 192,
25 Pac. 394 (1890) ; State v. Lutes, 38 Wash. 2d 475, 230 P.2d 786 (1951).
Others have restricted the rule so that the signature on the instrument must purport
to be that of another in order to complete the offense-the so-called "narrow rule."
Greathouse v. United States, 170 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1948) ; Green v. State, 76 So.
2d 645 (Fla. 1954). The use of the different rules has resulted in many seemingly
inconsistent decisions. See Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 852 (1956).
10 Though thus limited in scope, the discussion is applicable to the common law
of forgery in general. See note 5 supra.
1 Martyn v. United States, 176 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1949); Wright v. United
States, 172 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1949) ; Greathouse v. United States, 170 F.2d 512
(4th Cir. 1948) ; United States v. Greever, 116 F. Supp. 755 (D.D.C. 1953) ; United
States v. Gallagher, 94 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Pa. 19S0) ; cf. United States v. Flores,
66 F. Supp. 880 (D. Virgin Islands 1946) ; United States v. Woods, 58 F. Supp.
451 (N.D. W.Va. 1945).
'- United States v. Greever, supra note 11; cf. La Fever v. United States, 257
F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1958).
11116 F. Supp. 755 (D.D.C. 1953).
'18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1952 and Supp. IV 1957).

1 The checks were apparently drawn in the District of Columbia, though the
opinion does not specifically state this.
'"

PERRINS, CRIMINAL LAW

297 (1957).

' 170 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1948).
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several checks "Woodruff Motor Sales, Inc., J. W. Greathouse." He
represented to the person cashing the checks that Woodruff Motor
Sales was the name in which he did business. In fact the motor
company was completely fictitious, and neither it nor the defendant
had an account at the bank on which the check was drawn. The
court held that no forgery had been committed.' 8
The court recognized that forgery can exist when the name used is a
fictitious one, as treated in the succeeding section of this Note; here,
however, although the defendant signed the name of a fictitious company,
the check was accepted on the strength of his apparent authority as agent,
and not in reliance on the name of the company. One treatise explains:
An additional point is to be noted in cases in which one fraudulently purports to act as agent for another. If he has no power or
authority to act in this capacity, the other will not be bound; but
if the signature contains both names and shows that the signer was
purporting to act as agent for the other, the writing is not a
forgery. Strictly speaking there is a false writing in such a case
because it purports to be the instrument of the principal whereas it
is not so in fact; but since any reliance will be upon the implied
warrant of authority clearly manifested by the writing, rather than
upon any deceptive appearance of the writing itself, it is felt not to
come within the type of wrong which forgery is designed to
punish. This is the theory back of the holding that signing a note
in the name of a fictitious firm, purportedly made up of the writer
and another person, is not forgery though done with intent to
defraud. The writing binds the man who wrote it and is false
merely in the implied warrant of authority to bind the other.19
INSTRUMENT EXECUTED IN FICTITIOUS NAME AND NOT PRESENTED

One may sign a fictitious name to an instrument and
pass the instrument off as that of the fictitious person. If it is not
signed in the presence of the person defrauded, and it is passed without
reference to any particular person, this has been held to constitute
forgery.20 An example is where an individual draws a check in a
fictitious name, payable to himself, and negotiates the check to a person
who knows him by his true name. 21 Or, the defendant may fill in a
fictitious name as payee on a traveler's check and negotiate it purely
" "[T]he charge of forgery in this case is not sustained by the fact that the
AS ONE'S OWN.

defendant, with intent to defraud, drew the checks in his own name upon a bank
in which he had no funds, or that he signed the name of Woodruff Motor Sales,
Inc., whether that was the name in which he did business, as he claimed, or was
merely the name of a non-existent corporation, as indicated by other testimony."
Greathouse v. United States, 170 F.2d 512, 514 (4th Cir. 1948).
" PmuuiNs, CRImiNAL LAW 297 (1957).
"°Rowley v. United States, 191 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1951); Jones v. United
States, 234 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1956).
"xJones v. United States, supra note 20.
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on the strength of the countersignature and without emphasis on his
22
own individuality or identity.
When a fictitious name is signed in the presence of the one defrauded, it would seem that something more is required in order to
constitute forgery. The person represented by the fictitious name must
take on personality or character separate and apart from the person
actually presenting the check, so that credit can be extended to such
personality.23 The principal case seems to be the only case under the
act involving this type situation.
In the Hubsch case, the court recognizes the existence of a "broad
rule" and a "narrow rule" defining forgery,24 and in ruling on the
sufficiency of the indictment, expressly rejects the "narrow rule."
However, in ruling on the question of guilt under the facts of the case,
the court makes no attempt to fit the facts into either rule. Instead the
court apparently used as a test the rationale adopted in the early English
case of Regina v. Martin,25 that where the payee in accepting the check
has relied on and given credit to the person presenting the check, as
distinguished from the name or signature, there has been no forgery.20
It would seem that the court correctly applied this theory to the facts
as developed under both counts of the indictment. When the hospital
representative accepted defendant's check in payment for treatment
received, the name "Weinstein," if it meant anything to the hospital, was
important only in so far as it represented the man presenting it; that is,
the individual who had received the treatment. 27 But the jeweler was
not satisfied with accepting the check written by the defendant, a mere
stranger. He accepted the check written by the defendant only after
the defendant had shown him credentials identifying "Weinstein" as a
particular personality-a Mason and Shriner from Atlanta. Relying
on the faith and credit of a check purporting to be signed by "Weinstein,"
the jeweler accepted the defendant's check. Clearly the reliance was not
placed on the person presenting the check (the defendant), but on the
signature as creating a valid obligation.
Rowley v. United States, 191 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1951).
The principle was recognized in England at least as early as 1765 in the
case of Rex v. Dunn, 1 Leach C.L. 57, 168 Eng. Rep. 131 (1765). For an old,
but excellent,- discussion of the principle involved, see Brown, The Forgery of
FictitiousNames, 30 Am. L. REv. 500, 513 (1896).
24 See note 9 supra.

'55 Q.B.D. 34 (1879).
2'In that case the defendant signed a fictitious name to the check, but the
payee, in accepting the check, did not notice that the name was not that of the
defendant. The defendant was well known to the payee and it was clear that the
payee accepted the check as that of the defendant. It was held that the defendant
was not guilty of forgery. Regina v. Martin, supra note 25.
" As the court pointed out: "It does not appear that the Hospital would have
declined to accept the check had it been signed by Hubsch in his own name or in
any other name." Hubsch v. United States, 256 F.2d 820, 824 (5th Cir. 1958).
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It is submitted that the test applied in the Hubsch case is in accord
with the technical rules of forgery, and that it is a valid test in
determining whether, under the particular fact situation, the crime of
forgery has been committed by the use of a fictitious name. However,
it may be questioned whether an area already beset with technicalities
and dubious distinctions should be further complicated by revitalizing a
test which originated in the days when forgery was a capital offense.
HENRY E. FRYE
Sales-Liability of Remote Vendor on Implied Warranty
Plaintiff,' a manufacturer of refrigerated biscuits, purchased "Snow
Ice" (an integral part of its biscuits sold for human consumption) from
a distributor, who had bought the product from the defendant ice
manufacturer. Upon finding glass in the ice, plaintiff, at considerable
expense, destroyed the biscuits and biscuit dough and recalled the
biscuits made the previous day with the glass-contaminated dough.
Plaintiff sued the ice manufacturer in federal district court to recover
these expenses. The biscuit company, conceding the lack of contractual
privity with defendant and foregoing the negligence theory, contended
defendant was liable under Texas law by reason of the Decker2 case. In
that case it was held that a non-negligent manufacturer who processed
and sold contaminated food to a retailer for resale and human consumption was liable to a consumer for injuries sustained by him as a
result of eating such food. The court, after noting a trend of the
Texas courts away from the Decker holding, distinguished that case
and held it inapplicable on the ground that it involved a consumer eater
whereas the principal case involved a consumer non-eater.3 The lack
Gladiola Biscuit Co. v. Southern Ice Co., 163 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Tex. 1958).
Jacob E. Decker & Sons. Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
"Liability in such a case is not based on negligence, nor on a breach of the usual

implied contractual warranty, but on the broad principle of the public policy to
protect human health and life." Id. at 612, 164 S.W.2d at 829. Thus privity of
contract between plaintiff and defendant is. not necessary under the Decker rule.
I The court may have been influenced by the so-called general rule that there
is no implied warranty of fitness for food where the sale is made by one dealer
to another dealer for purposes of resale, as distinguished from a sale by a dealer
to a buyer for immediate consumption. Howard v. Emerson, 110 Mass. 320
(1872); Emerson v. Brigham, 10 Mass. 197 (1813); Moses v. Mead, 1 Denio
378 (N.Y. 1845) ; 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 242 (Rev. ed. 1948) ; Perkins, Unwholesome Food as a Source of Liability, 5 IowA L. BULL. 6, 17-18 (1919) ; Annot., 15
L.R.A. (n.s.) 886 (1908); Annot., 22 L.R.A. 195 (1893); Annot., 14 L.R.A. 494
(1891). Texas has experienced difficulty with this rule, and there are inconsistent
cases dealing with it. Comment, 32 TEXAS L. Ray. 557, 564-66 (1954).
Other jurisdictions hold that the sale by one dealer to another dealer for purposes
of resale carries with it an implied warranty that the goods are wholesome and
fit for food. Annot, 1917F L.R.A. 472. A recent case is Draughon v. Maddox,
237 N.C. 742, 75 S.E.2d 917. (1953), 32 N.C.L. REv. 351 (1954).
No matter which line of cases is accepted, the implied warranty of merchantability would be equally available in the dealer-to-dealer sale for purposes of resale
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of contractual privity was deemed to preclude recovery on an implied
warranty theory. Accordingly, a verdict was directed for the defendant.
The Decker case had concerned the liability of a manufacturer.
Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey,4 decided the same day, resolved in favor
of the consumer the question of whether a retailer of foodstuffs was
liable on implied warranty. A review of the Texas law of implied
warranties since Griggs and Decker indicates the trend away from the
philosophy evinced by the court in those decisions. In Bowman
Biscuit Co. v. Hines,5 the Texas Supreme Court refused to apply the
Griggs rule against a wholesaler. In a five to four decision it was held
that one who had sustained injury from eating contaminated food
purchased in a sealed package from a retailer who had bought the
product from the wholesaler could not recover damages in a direct
action against the wholesaler. Four majority justices favored overruling Griggs and since in their view a retailer would not be liable,
a fortiori, defendant wholesaler, who was one step further removed
from the consumer and with whom there was no privity, should not be
made liable. Four minority justices approved the Griggs rule and
said that adherence to this rule should require a finding of wholesaler
liability. The ninth justice, distinguishing between wholesaler and
retailer liability, considered Griggs inapplicable and concurred with the
"majority" in result only. Thus the Bowman Biscuit Co. case preserved
the Griggs rule but held no wholesaler liability to a consumer not in
contractual privity. Paradoxically, this ultimate state of the law was
approved by only one of the nine justices who decided the Bowman
Biscuit Co. case. 6 In two significant situations, where the container 7
as in a dealer-to-buyer sale for immediate consumption. DicIaMsoN, PRODUcrS
LI.AILITY AND THrE FOOD CoNsumFR 30 (1951) ; Perkins, supra at 18-19; Prosser,
The Implied Warranty Of Merchantable Quality, 27 MiNx. L. Rxv. 117 (1943).
North Carolina follows this latter rule in Ashford v. H. C. Shrader Co., 167 N.C.
45, 47, 83 S.E. 29, 31 (1914) and Lexington Grocery Co. v. Vernoy, 167 N.C. 427,
428, 83 S.E. 567, 568 (1914).
' 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942). The Griggs case, as did Decker, imposed a warranty on defendant as a matter of public policy. See 21 TEXAs L. REv.
454 (1942) for a discussion of these two cases.
. 151 Tex. 370, 251 S.W.2d 153 (1952), 31 TEXAs L. REv. 594 (1953), 1953
WASH. U.L.Q. 327, 10 WAsH. & LEE L. Rzv. 255 (1953).

'31

TEXAs

L. Rav. 594, 597 (1953).

'In Annheuser-Busch v. Butler, 180 S.W.2d 996 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944)
plaintiff bought beer in a tavern, took it home, and opened it. The bottle exploded,
injuring plaintiff. Defendant was held not liable on implied warranty of fitness.
Distinguishing the Decker case in which injury was caused by eating, the court
said, [Here] there was no injury sustained as a result of eating or drinking
unwholesome food or drink. For aught we know, the beer may have been .. .
harmless .... The fact that the glass bottle . . .might have been defective or
improperly filled, or improperly capped, would not necessarily change the fitness
of the beer for human consumption." Id. at 997. Accord, Jax Beer Co. v.
Schaeffer, 173 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). In 23 TEXAS L. REv. 87, 88
(1944) it is said that these cases create an over-refined distinction in recognizing
liability when injury is caused by a piece of glass inside the bottle but denying
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rather than the foodstuff was defective and where the product was not
meant for immediate, internal consumption," Texas has refused to extend
the Decker rule.
How would the principal case be decided in North Carolina? Although a consumer without contractual privity can proceed against
the manufacturer on the theory of breach of express warranty where
the warranty is printed on the product container,9 there is some doubt
as to whether he can recover against the manufacturer on a theory of
breach of implied warranty. Thomason v. Ballard & Ballard Co.10
established the rule that in the absence of contractual privity, a consumer could not recover against a manufacturer on implied warranty.
However, in Davis v. Radford," which involved a consumer against
retailer for breach of implied warranty, the court stated that Simpson v.
American Oil Co.12 would permit the consumer without contractual
privity to maintain an action against the wholesaler 3 on the implied
warranty theory. 14 Some authorities 5 have interpreted this Davis
dictum as authority for the proposition that North Carolina no longer
requires privity in breach of implied warranty situations. Granting
that this dictum indicates an attitude that would not require privity, it
is submitted that the Thomason decision remains the rule. Accordingly,
the plaintiff biscuit company could not recover from the ice manufacturer
in North Carolina in a direct action. However, the manufacturer might
not escape liability. The plaintiff could maintain an action against the
liability where the defective bottle itself causes injury. See PRossEa, ToRTs § 84,
at 509
ed. 1955).
'In(2d
Brown
v. Howard, 285 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) a manufacturer
of insecticide spray was sued by the owner of some cattle which had been killed
by the spray. Because of no contractual privity between plaintiff and defendant,
there was no breach of implied warranty. The court seemed to regard the Decker
rule as onerous.
'Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940).
10208 N.C. 1, 179 S.E. 30 (1935). This rule is repeated in dictum in Caudle v.
F. M. Bohannon Tobacco Co., 220 N.C. 105, 110, 16 S.E.2d 680, 683 (1941) and
Enloe v. Charlotte Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 208 N.C. 305, 307, 180 S.E. 582, 583
(1935).
11233 N.C. 283, 63 S.E.2d 822 (1951).
1217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940).
'a It
would appear that by this language plaintiff could proceed against the
manufacturer as well as the wholesaler, because when the privity requirement is
removed, the plaintiff can sue either the retailer, wholesaler, or manufacturer.
Heimsoth v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 1 Ill.
App. 2d 28, 116 N.E.2d 193 (1953).
" "In case of sale of goods for human consumption the requirement of privity
of contract is not always controlling....
"Under the decision in Simpson v. Oil Co.... it would seem that the plaintiff
[consumer] here could have maintained an action against . . . the distributor, for
the cause set out in his complaint, though he has elected to sue only the retail
dealer." 233 N.C. at 286, 63 S.E.2d at 825. It has been suggested that this
dictum should be weighed carefully against the Simpson Case, because that case
involved express warranty, whereas in the Davis case there was no express warranty. 30 N.C.L. REv. 191, 194 (1952).
1"

PaossER, TORTS § 84, at 509 n. 28 (2d ed. 1955).
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"Snow Ice" wholesaler, who apparently x6 could join the manufacturer
as party defendant so that the court could determine the ultimate liability
17
of the two defendants.
What result would have obtained under the Uniform Sales Act? s
It appears that plaintiff ordered the ice by description, 9 hence there
arose the implied warranty of merchantability 20 from the wholesaler to
plaintiff. This warranty would also exist between manufacturer and
wholesaler. 21 Some courts would extend the warranty to the ultimate

consumer. 22

The implied warranty of merchantability is included

in the Uniform Commercial Code. 23 However, a majority of the states
adopting these uniform acts 24 still requires privity in breach of implied
warranty cases.25 Hence the plaintiff would not be able to recover
26
in these states.
", The rule of the Davis case was that the retailer, when sued by the consumer
for breach of implied waranty, could join his (retailer's) vendor as a party
defendant.
,,N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-222 (1953). The theory suggested in the text presupposes that the manufacturer is subject to North Carolina's jurisdiction.
"8The Uniform Sales Act is in effect in 33 states, District of Columbia, Hawaii,
and Panama Canal Zone. UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, SALES at 6 (Supp. 1957).
North Carolina has not adopted the Uniform Sales Act.
"9A sale by description is any sale where there is no adequate opportunity to
inspect. Kohn v. Ball, 36"Tenn. App. 281, 254 S.W.2d 755 (1952).
.OUNIFORM

SALES

AcT § 15(2) : "Where the goods are bought by description

from a seller who deals in goods of that description (whether he be the grower or
manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be of
merchantable quality."
A popular meaning of merchantable quality is that goods must be reasonably
suited for the ordinary uses which they were manufactured to meet. Giant Manufacturing Co. v. Yates-American Machine Co., 111 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1940).
For more complete definitions of merchantability see 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 243
(Rev. ed. 1948), and Prosser, supra note 3, at 125-32.
21 See note 3 supra.
2Helms v. General Baking Co., 164 S.W.2d 150 (Mo. App. 1942) ; Markovich
v. McKesson and Robbins, Inc., 149 N.E.2d 181 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958) ; Baum v.
Murray, 23 Wash. 2d 890, 162 P.2d 801 (1945). Contra, Smith v. Salem Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 92 N.H. 97, 25 A.2d 125 (1942), Lombardi v. California Packing
Sales Co., 83 R.I. 51, 112 A.2d 701 (1955).
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 2-314(2): "Goods to be merchantable must be at
least such as
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which suqh goods are used; . . ." The
Uniform Commercial Code is in effect at the date of this writing in Pennsylvania
and Massachusetts. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A §§ 1-101 through 10-104 (1953)
MAss. G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 106 (1957).
2
UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED, SALES § 15, n. 10.
However, the trend is toward abandoning the privity requirement. DICKERSON, PRODTS LIADILITy AND THE FOOD CONSUMER 63-65, 94-99 (1951); SMITH
AND

PROSSER,

CASES

AND

MATERIALS

ON

TORTS

906, 912

(2d ed. 1957); 1

§ 244 n. 7 (Rev. ed. 1948) and Supp. (1957). New York seems
to have broken away recently from the privity requirement in Welch v. Schiebelhuth,
169 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1957), Comment, 24 BROOKLYN L. REv. 308 (1958), 9
SYRACUSE L. REv. 326 (1958).
f2 Regarding the Uniform Commercial Code, this result is unfortunate. Section 43
of the Uniform Revised Sales Act, which has been replaced by § 2-318 of the Code,
provided an almost complete departure from the antiquated privity requirement.
See Note, 29 IND. L.J. 173, 184-88 (1954). The Code has made a change in
the present privity requirement in that a member of the buyer's family or a guest
WLISrON, SALES
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The decision in the principal case is harsh in that it necessitates
circuity of action. Plaintiff can sue only the middleman, who in turn will
sue the ice manufacturer in order to place liability at the point of origin.
The biscuit company is placed in the anomalous position of being
subject to liability without contractual privity, under the Decker rule,
to a consumer who sustains injury by eating unwholesome biscuits.
Yet the company which has been diligent in preventing injury to ultimate consumers by destroying the glass-contaminated dough cannot
recover its loss from the ice manufacturer because of a lack of contractual
privity.27

It is submitted that this privity requirement is law for

28
law's sake.

WILLIAm

H.

MCCULLOUGH

Torts-Charitable Immunity
The doctrine that charitable institutions1 are immune from liability
for torts committed by their servants evolved from dictum set forth in
2
Duncan,v. Findlater,
an English case decided in 1839. This doctrine
was later recognized and followed in England for a brief period; it was
completely discarded in 1866.3
McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital,4 in 1876, was the
first case to adopt the doctrine in this country, the court holding that
a charity was immune from liability if it had exercised due care in the
selection and retention of its servants. Since that time a majority of
the states have followed the Massachusetts rule, but have differed greatly
of the buyer no longer is required to have privity with the buyer's vendor to
recover for breach of implied warranty. But a suit by a buyer agaiist a remote
vendor is left unchanged, therefore the majority rule requiring privity in such a
situation is left intact. Legislation, 15 U. PiTt. L. REv. 331, 352-55 (1954).
"7Of course plainitiff could sue defendant on grounds of negligence, but in this
case this theory would be quite difficult to prove. PROSSEa, TOarS § 84, at 505
(2d ed. 1955).
28 Spruill, Privily Of Contract as a Requisite for Recovery On Warranty,
19 N.C.L. REv. 551, 565-66 (1941).
1 An institution "is deemed to be eleemosynary or charitable where its property
is derived from charitable gifts or bequests and administered, not for purpose of
gain but in interest of humanity.

. .

."

Ettlinger v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon

College, 31 F.2d 869, 870 (2d Cir. 1929).
6 Clark and Fin. 894, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (H.L. 1839).
The dictum of Duncan v. Findlater, supra note 2, was followed in Holliday v.
St. Leonard's, 11 C.B.N.S. 192, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861). However, this case was
expressly overruled by Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, L.R. 1 H.L. 93, 11 Eng.
Rep. 1500 (1866), thus repudiating the doctrine in England. See also Hillyer v.
St. Bartholomew's Hospital [1909] 2 K.B. 820; Foreman v. Canterbury Corp.,
L.R. 6 Q.B. 214 (1871).
'120 Mass. 432 (1876). This case was decided ten years after Mersey Docks
Trustees v. Gibbs, supra note 3, had overruled the doctrine in England; but the
Massachusetts court relies on Holliday v. St. Leonard's, supra note 3.
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both as to the reasons for invoking the rule5 and as to the situations in
which the rule should be applied. 6 However, an examination of recent
'At least five theories have been used in upholding the immunity doctrine.
(1) "Trust Fund" theory. Under this theory the courts refuse recovery on the
ground that the donor intended the funds to be used only for charitable
purposes, and to allo-w them to be diverted therefrom would misappropriate
the fund. See e.g., Jensen v. Maine Eye and Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408,
78 AtI. 898 (1910) ; Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1885) ; McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hospital, supra note 4; Adams v. University
Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S.W. 453 (1907) ; Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd,
120 Pa. 624, 15 Atl 533 (1888).
(2) Inapplicability of respondeat superior. This is based on the theory that a
charity has performed its entire duty when it tenders to a beneficiary a
competent servant, and from that instant he is the servant of the beneficiary
rather than that of the charitable institution. See e.g., Fordyce v. Woman's
Christian Nat'l Library Ass'n, 79 Ark. 550, 96 S.W. 155 (1906) ; Hearns v.
Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 Atl. 595 (1895); Whittaker v. St.
Luke's Hospital, 137 Mo. App. 116, 117 S.W. 1189 (1908).
(3) "Governmental Immunity" theory. Because of close association with the
state, some courts have cloaked charitable institutions with an immunity
like that of the state and its agencies. See e.g., Fordyce v. Woman's
Christian Nat'l Library Ass'n, supra; University of Louisville v. Hammock,
127 Ky. 564, 106 S.W. 219 (1907) ; Morrison v. Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 160
N.W. 173 (1917).
(4) "Implied Waiver" theory. This theory is based on the idea that when one
enters a charitable institution and accepts its services he thereby waives all
right to claim damages for injuries suffered as a result of the negligence
of the institution or its servants. See e.g., Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter
Day Saints Hospital, 59 Idaho 350, 82 P2d 849 (1938); Cook v. John
N. Norton Memorial Infirmary, 180 Ky. 331, 102 S.W. 847 (1918);
Bruce v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 51 Nev. 372, 277 Pac. 789 (1929).
(5) "Public Policy" theory. Some courts have stated that they are denying
liability because it is against public policy. See e.g., Hearns v. Waterbury
Hospital, supra; Lindler v. Columbia Hospital, 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512
(1914); Weston v. Hospital of St. Vincent, 131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785

(1921).

For a discussion of the theories of immunity see Note, 30 N.C.L. Rav. 67
(1951).
6 Some states allow complete immunity from liability. See e.g., Jensen v.
Maine Eye and Ear Infirmary, supra note 5(1); Conklin v. John Howard Industrial
Home, 224 Mass. 222, 112 N.E. 606 (1916); Steden v. Jewish Memorial Hospital
Ass'n, 239 Mo. App. 38, 187 S.W.2d 469 (1945). Others limit execution of
judgment to nontrust property. See e.g., Saint Mary's Academy v. Solomon 77
Colo. 463, 238 Pac. 22 (1925) ; Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950);
McLeod v. St. Thomas Hospital, 170 Tenn. 432, 95 S.W.2d 917 (1936).
Some states allow immunity to be invoked as against strangers. See e.g.,
Jackson v. Atlanta Goodwill Industries, 46 Ga. App. 425, 167 S.W. 702 (1933) ;
Foley v. Wesson Memorial Hospital, 246 Mass. 363, 141 N.E. 113 (1923). Others
say the immunity doctrine does not apply as against strangers. See e.g., Winona
Technical Institute v. Stolte, 173 Ind. 39, 89 N.E. 393 (1909) ; Bruce v. Central
Methodist Episcopal Church, 147 Mich. 230, 110 N.W. 951 (1907).
Immunity does not extend to torts committed by one servant against another
servant, according to some states. See e.g., Cowans v. North Carolina Baptist
Hospitals, Inc., 197 N.C. 41, 147 S.E. 672 (1929). However, other states say the
immunity doctrine does apply in this situation. See e.g., Emery v. Jewish Hospital
Ass'n, 193 Ky. 400, 236 S.W. 577 (1921); Reavy v. Guild of St. Agnes, 284
Mass. 300, 187 N.E. 557 (1933).
Some states make no distinction between paying and non-paying beneficiaries,
and say that both are subject to the doctrine of immunity. See e.g., Williams v.
Randolph Hospital, Inc., 237 N.C. 387, 75 S.E.2d 303 (1952) ; Gable v. Sisters of
St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 Atl. 1087 (1910). Others do make such a distinction
and say that a charitable institution is liable to a paying beneficiary. See e.g.,
Sisters of Sorrowful Mother v. Zeidler, 183 Okla. 454, 82 P.2d 996 (1938).
For a complete listing of cases, see Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 29 (1952).
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decisions reveals that an increasing number of jurisdictions have held
charities liable for the torts of their servants on the same basis as
privately operated institutions, 7 reaching this result either (1) by
initially refusing to follow the doctrine of immunity, or, more important,
(2) by overruling earlier decisions which did follow the rule.
Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary8 is a recent decision exemplifying this modern trend. In this case the plaintiff sought to recover against the defendant hospital, a charitable institution, for injuries
allegedly due to the negligence of the hospital's servant. The lower
court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, relying on D'Amato v.
Orange Menwrial Hospital,9 the case establishing the doctrine of
charitable immunity in New Jersey. On appeal, the decision was reversed. The supreme court, in reviewing the various theories of immunity, 10 decided that the only one which could be considered valid was
the "public policy" theory. As to this theory, the court stated:
It may perhaps be that when D'Anato was rendered in 1925 it
accurately represented the then prevailing notions of public
policy. But times and circumstances have changed"1 and we do
not believe that it faithfully represents current notions of rightness
and fairness. Due care is expected of all, and when an organiza"President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810
(D.C. Cir. 1942) ; Brigham Young University v. Lillywhite, 118 F.2d 836 (10th
Cir. 1941); Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951);
Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951) ; St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n
v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P.2d 917 (1952) ; Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, 46
Del. 350, 83 A.2d 753 (Super. Ct. 1951) ; Wilson v. Lee Memorial Hospital, 65 So.
2d 40 (Fla. 1953) ; Wheat v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital, 78 Idaho 60,
297 P.2d 1041 (1956) ; Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45
N.W.2d 151 (1950); Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934
(1954); Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverin, 144 Minn. 392, 175 N.W.
699 (1920) ; Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142
(1951) ; Welch v. Frisbie Memorial Hospital, 90 N.H. 337, 9 A.2d 761 (Sup. Ct.
1939) ; Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (Sup.
Ct. 1958) ; Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3 (Ct. App. 1957) ; Richbeil
v. Grafton Deaconness Hospital, 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W.2d 247 (1946) ; Avellone v.
St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956) ; Gable v. Salvation
Army, 186 Okla. 687, 100 P.2d 244 (1940); Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12
RI. 141 (1879); Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d 230
(1950); Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 43 Wash. 2d 162,
260 P.2d 765 (1953).
8 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 273 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
9 101 N.J.L. 61, 127 Atl. 340 (Ct. Err. & App. 1925).
10 See note 5 supra.
Charitable institutions themselves have changed since the rule was initiated.
"Then they were largely small institutions, many connected with churches, and
of limited means. Today they have become, in many instances, big businesses,
handling large funds, managing and owning large properties and set up by large
trusts or foundations. It is idle to argue that donations for them will dry up if
the charity is held to respond for its torts the same as other institutions or that
the donors are giving the funds or setting up large foundations for charitable
purposes with the expectation that the charities they benefit will not be responsible
like other institutions for negligent injury. Such charities enjoy endowments and
resources beyond anything thought of when the matter of immunity was first
being considered." Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 134, 70 A.2d
230, 236 (1950).
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tion's negligent conduct injures another there should, in all
justice and equity, be a basis for recovery
12 without regard to
whether the defendant is a private charity.
Thus, New Jersey, by overruling its prior decisions, effectively abandoned
the doctrine of charitable immunity.
This same result was reached a year earlier in a New York decision,13
where the court, reasoning along the same lines as the New Jersey court,
rejected the immunity doctrine, stating that "a distinction unique in the
14
law should rest on stronger foundations than those advanced.'
Courts generally have not gone from the extreme of full immunity to
no immunity in one decision. Instead, the process usually follows this
pattern: (1) the courts initially state the general rule that charitable
institutions are immune from liability if they exercise due care in selecting
and retaining their servants; (2) the rule, thus established, is "devoured"
by many exceptions;15 and (3) from this point, the rule is then completely discarded. This is borne out by the developments leading up to
the principal case. 16
This "devouring" of the rule by exceptions, evidenced by the great
variance of rules and reasons therefor, is a strong indication that
something is wrong and that correction, though in process, is incomplete. 17 In such a state of flux, it would seem that the rule should be
critically re-examined by all courts as to its fundamental soundness and
compatibility with present day needs and modern ideas of justice.' 8
North Carolina first held to the general rule that the only duty
imposed on the charitable institution was that of exercising reasonable
care in selecting and retaining its servants ;19 then an exception was made
whereby an injured servant of a charitable institution did not have to
show lack of due care in selection or retention of the negligent servant
12 27 N.J. at 39, 141 A.2d at 282.
13 Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3 (Ct. App. 1957). This recent
decision destroyed the last remnants of charitable immunity in New York.

" Bing v. Thunig, supra note 13 at 663, 143 N.E.2d at 7.

Judged by results
'" "The 'rule' has not held in the tests of time and decision.
President and Directors of Georgetown
it has been devoured in 'exceptions.'"
College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
"'The rule was laid down in D'Amato v. Orange Memorial Hospital, 101
N.J.L. 61, 127 Atl. 230 (Ct. Err. & App. 1925). An exception as to strangers was
made in Simmons v. Wiley Methodist Episcopal Church, 112 N.J.L. 129, 170 Atl.
237 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934). Recovery by a servant was allowed. Rose v.
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp., 136 N.J.L. 553, 57 A.2d 29 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1948). Thus only the "beneficiaries" of charities were barred from recovery at the time of the Collopy case, note 8 supra.
"' President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810
(D.C. Cir. 1942).
18 "[S] tare decisis has no legitimate application to doctrines of the law of torts
built upon a mistaken foundation persisting in the books after that foundation has
been undermined, which are out of accord with general principles recognized today,
so that if they are rejected the general law is clarified rather than unsettled."
13 NACCA L.J. 23 (1954).
" Barden v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 152 N.C. 318, 67 S.E. 971 (1910).
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as a prerequisite to recovery ;20 and it would seem that charitable immunity would not be invoked as against a stranger to the charity, 2'
although there is no case in North Carolina holding squarely on this
point. Thus when Williams v. Randolph Hospital, Inc.22 came before
the court, the immunity rule of North Carolina was very similar to that
in New Jersey when the principal case arose. However, the North
Carolina court adopted a much different attitude from that taken by
the court in the principal case. 23 The New Jersey court carefully reviewed the theories of immunity and then discarded the doctrine entirely. The North Carolina court merely mentioned the "trust fund,"
"implied waiver," and "public policy" theories and refused to discuss
their merits or demerits. It did agree that they may be subject to some
meritorious criticism, but said that "the numerical weight of authority
is on the side of immunity." Then it stated that a number of jurisdictions
have reached the same result as that of qualified immunity by holding the
doctrine of respondeat superior inapplicable as between the charity and
24
its employees.
Since the latter theory is discussed separately and approved by the
court, the inapplicability of respondeat superior to charitable institutions, 25 as against beneficiaries of such institutions, is apparently the
basis for the doctrine of immunity in North Carolina.
One's liability for the negligence of his alleged servant is generally
determined by his right and power to direct and control the servant in
the performance of his duty at the instant the negligent act or omission
occurs.2 6

Applying this test to the situation where the negligence of

an employee of a charity results in an injury to a beneficiary, it seems
clear that the charity, having the right and power to direct and control
its employees, would be the true master; it is only through the use of a
legal fiction that the beneficiary can be said to be the master in such a
situation.2 7 There is no sound legal principle under which respondeat
superior should be held inapplicable to a charitable institution and at
28
the same time applicable to an institution privately owned and operated.
Thus, it appears that the inapplicability of respondeat superior to charitable institutions is as indefensible as the other theories of immunity
20 Cowans v. North Carolina Baptist Hospitals, Inc., 197 N.C. 41, 147 S.E. 672
(1929).
21

See Williams v. Union County Hospital Ass'n, Inc., 234 N.C. 536, 67 S.E.2d

662 (1951) (by implication).
22237 N.C. 387, 75 S.E.2d 303 (1953).

"For a discussion of the North Carolina law on this subject, see Note, 32

N.C.L. RFv. 129 (1953).
24237 N.C. at 390, 75 S.E.2d at 305.
22 See note 5 supra.
2 P. F. Collier & Son Distributing Corp. v. Drinkwater, 81 F2d 200, 202 (4th

Cir.', 1936).
Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951).
28 Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 106, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

which, as the North Carolina court has agreed, may be "subject to some
measure of meritorious criticism."
However, the court indicates that even if respondeat superior were
applicable, the principle of stare decisis would require that any departure
made from the rule of immunity be made by the legislature-due to the
great weight of authority in North Carolina established over many
years.2 9 But, if the reasons for the rule are at best doubtful, why should
stare decisis be applied without at least reviewing the rule? North
Carolina has agreed that: "Where vital and important public or private
rights are concerned, and the decisions regarding them are to have a
direct and permanent influence on all future time, it becomes the duty
as well as the right of the court to consider them carefully and to allow
no previous error to continue, if it can be corrected."3 0
Though declaration of public policy is primarily a legislative function,
the courts also have authority to declare a public policy which already
exists-and to base their decisions on that ground. 8 ' Immunity,
basically unsound under all legal theories, could only have been created
by the courts in response to what appeared at the time to be proper as
a matter of public policy.3 2 Therefore, when the need for such a public
policy no longer obtains, the court should declare that it no longer
exists; and especially is this true where it was initiated by the courts
instead of the legislature. 88
For negligent or tortious conduct, liability is the rule, and immunity
the exception. 34 The avowed purpose of the rule of immunity is to
protect the charity. Actually, it clothes charitable and non-profit organizations with special privileges not available to other organizations8 5
It seems clear that most authorities would agree today that: (1) the need
for the rule no longer exists; (2) the underlying reasons for the rule
are not valid; and (3) the charitable institution is no longer the small
institution it was when the rule was initially formulated. This being
true, why should not the law itself-even assuming it to have been justifiable when initially made--change so as to reflect these facts?
9 Williams

v. Randolph Hospital, Inc., 237 N.C. 387, 75 S.E.2d 303 (1953).

Prior to this case, there were three cases in which all of the necessary elementsa charitable institution, a beneficiary, and a servant who, though carefully selected
and retained, had been negligent-were present: Williams v. Union County Hospital

Ass'n, 234 N.C. 536, 67 S.E.2d 662 (1951) ; Herndon v. Massey, 217 N.C. 610, 8
S.E.2d 914 (1940) ; Barden v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 152 N.C. 318, 67 S.E. 971

(1910).
"0Mason v. A. E. Nelson Cotton Co., 148 N.C. 492, 510, 62 S.E. 625, 631
(19)ay v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951).
22

Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951).

33 Ibid.

",President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes 130 F.2d 810
(D.C. Cir. 1942).
22 Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954).
8

But see, Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 43 Wash. 2d
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This is the attitude taken by the New Jersey court in the principal
case. It is submitted that this should be the attitude taken by any
court in reviewing the subject.
To11MAs

L. NoRuis, JR.

Torts--Lookout-Duty to Maintain at Green Light
In the recent case of Currin v. Williams,1 plaintiff entered the intersection with a green light in his favor but without maintaining a lookout
for traffic approaching on the intersecting street. Defendant entered the
intersection from plaintiff's left while the traffic control signal facing
him was red. Though not conclusive, there was some evidence to support a conclusion that had plaintiff looked he would have been put on
notice that defendant was not going to stop. Held: Plaintiff's failure to
look to the right and the left when he entered the intersection on the
green light was not contributory negligence as a matter of law, but the
issue of contributory negligence was properly submitted to the jury.
Since, in accidents of this nature, failure to maintain a lookout is
invariably alleged, it is essential that attorneys know (1) what is meant
by lookout,2 (2) what constitutes the motorist's duty to maintain a
lookout, and (3) what effect automatic traffic signals have upon that

duty.
In its inception, lookout was probably a nautical term designating
that member of a ship's crew charged with the duty of keeping watch
for danger. 8 Stated quite simply, the duty of a motorist to maintain a
lookout is analogous to the duty of that crew member; the motorist
must keep watch for possible danger. 4 Quite naturally, one indispen162, 260 P.2d 765 (1953). There the court says: "Ordinarily, when a court decides
to modify or abandon a court made rule of long standing, it starts out by saying
that 'the reason for the rule no longer exists.' In this case it is correct to say
that the 'reason' originally given for the rule of immunity never did exist." Id.
at 167, 260 P.2d at 768.
1248 N.C. 32, 102 S.E.2d 455 (1958).
' One of a number of descriptive words usually accompanies the word lookout.
See, e.g., Wright v. Ponitz, 44 Cal. App. 2d 215, 112 P.2d 25 (1941) (ordinary
careful lookout) ; Wilder v. Cadle, 227 Ky. 486, 13 S.W.2d 497 (1929) (reasonable
lookout) ; Broussard v. Hotard, 4 So. 2d 563 (La. App. 1941) (sharp lookout) ;
Wright v. Pegram, 244 N.C. 45, 92 S.E.2d 416 (1956) (proper lookout) ; Murray v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 218 N.C. 392, 11 S.E.2d 326 (1940) (reasonably careful
lookout).
'See Devore v. Schaffer, 245 Iowa 1017, 65 N.W.2d 553 (1954).
'There are four classes of hazards which the motorist must guard against:
(1) defects or hazards of the road surface, (2) objects or persons standing or
moving in the path of the approaching vehicle, (3) . objects or hazards which,
without negligence, may enter or attempt to enter the path of the vehicle prior to,
or at the time of, its passage, (4) objects or persons which negligently enter or
attempt to enter the path of the vehicle prior to, or at the time of, its
passage. Barrett, Mechanics of Control and Lookout in Automobile Law, 14
TuL L. Rtv. 493, 507 (1940).
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sable element in the maintenance of a lookout is the use of the eyes. To
fulfill his obligation, the motorist must not limit the observation to his
immediate front ;5 he must look to the sides-right and left-and to
the rear as well. 6 Of course, the courts will take cognizance of the fact
that he cannot simultaneously look in four different directions. 7 In
many situations common sense will dictate in which direction a driver
should look first;8 however, there is no mathematical formula for determining when the obligation is fulfilled, 9 because looking is only a part
of the duty. Not only must the driver look, but the purpose of looking
must be accomplished;1O and if there is evidence that he did not see
what he ought to have seen, it is considered as evidence of failure to
maintain a lookout." Thus, stated broadly and generally, it appears
that the duty to maintain a lookout requires that the driver have an
awareness of those things surrounding him which are visible and which
might have the effect of impeding the safe progress of his motor vehicle.
A question frequently raised is whether the same lookout is required in the face of an automatic traffic signal showing green as is
required absent the automatic traffic signal. To arrive at a sensible
answer to the question, it is necessary to know that automatic traffic
signals are placed at intersections to render crossings less dangerous
and to facilitate the flow of traffic.12 Since traffic lawfully in the
intersection when the light changes must be allowed to clear the inter5

Mumford v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 63 (D. Md. 1957); Ehrhard v.

Ruan Transp. Corp., 245 Iowa 193, 61 N.W.2d 696 (1953) ; Brooks v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 91 So. 2d 403 (La. App. 1956) ; Evett v. Corbin, 305 S.W.2d
469 (Mo. 1957).
' Scott v. Marshall, 90 Ohio App. 347, 105 N.E.2d 281 (1951). See Kosbar v.
Johnson, 185 Pa. Super. 510, 138 A.2d 872 (1958), where it was stated that one
is not required to stop at every tree and clump of shrubs and look behind the
leaves to see if an automobile lurks in ambush. Naturally the degree of care required in making observations to the rear is not as great as the degree of care
required in making observations to the front. Dreher v. Divine, 192 N.C. 325, 135
S.E. 29 (1926).
"Gross v. Smith, 388 Pa. 92, 130 A.2d 90 (1957); Koehler v. Schwartz, 382
Pa. 352, 115 A.2d 155 (1955).
a For example, when a motorist is approaching an intersection, he should first
look to his left, because he first enters the lane in which traffic on his left is
moving. Grande v. Wooleyhan Transp. Co., 353 Pa. 535, 46 A:2d 241 (1946);
Dandridge v. Exhibitors Serv. Co., 167 Pa. Super. 143, 74 A.2d 670 (1950).
Bosell v. Rannestad, 226 Minn. 413, 33 N.W.2d 40 (1948). See also Davidson
v. Vast, 233 Iowa 534, 10 N.W.2d 12 (1943) ; Morrisette v. A. G. Boone Co., 235
N.C. 162, 69 S.E.2d 239 (1952) ; Bullock v. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 P.2d 350 (1940).
" Donnelly v. Goforth, 284 S.W.2d 462 (Mo. 1955) ; Taylor v. Brake, 245 N.C.
553, 96 S.E.2d 686 (1957). See also Peckham v. Knofla, 130 Conn. 646, 36 A.2d
740 (1944) ; Blakeman v. Lofland, 173 Kan. 725, 252 P.2d 852 (1953) ; Marshburn
v. Patterson, 241 N.C. 441, 85 S.E.2d 683 (1955) ; Shew v. Bailey, 37 Tenn. App.
40, 260 S.W.2d 362 (1951) ; Perry v. Thompson, 196 Va. 817, 86 S.E.2d 35 (1955).
" To look and fail to see what could have been seen by keeping a proper lookout
is as negligent as not to have looked at all. Goodhue v. Ballard, 122 Conn. 542, 191
Atl. 101 (1937) ; Mitchell v. Terrell, 55 So. 2d 699 (La. App. 1951) ; Donnelly v.
Goforth, supra note 10; Nehi Bottling Co. v. Lambert, 196 Va. 949, 86 S.E.2d 156

(1955).

12 Gross v. Smith, 388 Pa. 92, 130 A.2d 90 (1957).
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section before the motorist having the favorable signal proceeds, 13 the go
signal does not literally mean that the motorist can go under any and all
circumstances. 1 4 The signals are designed to prevent accidents and not
to excuse them ;15 therefore, it would be absurd to assume that a green
light gives the driver the privilege to wilfully or recklessly run down
people or automobiles with impunity. Reasonable care must be exercised
for the safety of others. 16 In approaching a blind unguarded intersection,
a motorist, in the exercise of reasonable care, must slow down to a
"snail's pace" and maneuver his automobile into a position where he can
look to the right and left along the intersecting street and determine that
the crossing can be made safely. 17 Is the same thing required when an
automatic traffic signal is placed at the intersection?
Answering the question in the affirmative, a minority has held that
the duty of a motorist to exercise care at an intersection is not relaxed
by reason of the presence of a green traffic signal.' 8 For purposes of
simplicity, the holding of these courts will be referred to as Rule 1.
On the other hand, a definite majority has answered the question in the
negative, holding that a green traffic light lessens the degree of care
required.'9 The holding of the latter courts will be referred to as
Rule 2. In view of the fact that a motorist is not required to anticipate
" Freeman v. Churchill, 30 Cal. 2d 453, 183 P.2d 4 (1947) ; fDavis v. Dondanville,
107 Ind. App. 665, 26 N.E.2d 568 (1940); Styskal v. Brickey, 158 Neb. 208, 62
N.W.2d 854 (1954); Indianapolis & Southeastern Trailways, Inc. v. Cincinnati
Street Ry., 166 Ohio St. 310, 142 N.E.2d 515 (1957); Lanegan v. Crauford, 49
Wash. 2d 562, 304 P.2d 953 (1956).
"4Scully v. Railway Express Agency, 137 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Pa. 1956);
Roland v. Murray, 239 S.W.2d 967 (Ky. 1951) ; Valench v. Belle Isle Cab Co.,
196 Md. 118, 75 A.2d 97 (1950) ; Witt v. Peterson, 310 S.W.2d 857 (Mo. 1958) ;
Fuss v. Williamson, 160 Neb. 141, 69 N.W.2d 539 (1955) ; Jordan v. Kennedy, 180
Pa.
Super. 593, 119 A.2d 679 (1956) ; Arney v. Bogstad, 199 Va. 460, 100 S.E.2d
749 (1957).
Adkins v. Smith, 98 S.E.2d 712 (W.Va. 1957).,
Cases cited note 14 mupra.
See Green v. Higbee, 176 Kan. 596, 272 P.2d 1084 (1954) ; Reaney v. Mabry,
97 So. 2d 841 (La. App. 1957) ; MacDonald v. Skornia, 322 Mich. 370, 34 N.W.2d
4 (1948) ; Papkin v. Helfand & Katz, 346 Pa. 485, 31 A.2d 112 (1943) ; Bailey v.
Zwirowski, 268 Wis. 208, 67 N.W.2d 262 (1954). See also Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d
1202 (1958).
"sSpence v. Waters, 39 Del. (9 W.W. Harr.) 582, 4 A.2d 142 (Super. Ct.
1938) ; Grimes v. Yellow Cab Co., 344 Pa. 298, 25 A.2d 294 (1942) ; Byrne v. 0. G.
Schultz, Inc., 306 Pa. 427, 160 Atl.. 125 (1932) ; Vol Cannon v. Philadelphia Transp,
Go., 148 Pa. Super. 330, 25 A.2d 584 (1942). "He must be vigilant, must exercise
This duty has not been relaxed by the introduction of
a high degree of care....
He is still bound to the same degree of care as
traffic officers and signals ....
before the introduction of these modern aids to travel." Byrne v. 0. G. Schultz,
Inc., supra at 433, 160 Atl. at 127. (Emphasis added) It may be arguable that
the court intended to require due care, but the language used certainly indicates
that more than due care was required.
79 Taylor v. Sims, 72 Cal. App. 2d 60, 164 P.2d 17 (1945); Sullivan v. Locke,
73 So. 2d 616 (La. App. 1954) ; Buehler v. Beadia, 343 Mich. 692, 73 N.W.2d 304
(1955) ; Hyder v. Asheville Storage Battery Co., 242 N.C. 553, 89 S.E.2d 124
(1955) ; Jordan v. Kennedy, 180 Pa. Super, 593, 119 A.2d 679 (1956) ; Wilson v.
Koch, 241 Wis. 594, 6 N.W.2d 659 (1942).
'7
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negligence on the part of others, Rule 2 seems eminently more sensible.
Take, for example, the case of a motorist approaching an intersection
which is surrounded by buildings that obstruct his view to the left and
to the right. If this motorist has a green light when he approaches the
intersection, what must he do? Not even Rule 1 would require him to
stop his automobile, get out and peer around the obstruction to see if
motorists approaching on the intersecting street are going to stop in
obedience to the red traffic signal. But it seems that Rule 1 would require him to bring his vehicle virtually to a halt, inch forward into the
intersection, and determine that vehicles approaching from his left and
right are going to stop. Having made that determination, he could then
proceed. Under Rule 2, the motorist having the green light could
proceed uninterruptedly into the intersection and make his observation
to the left and right while in progress.
Consider a second example. Six streets converge at one point.
Each street carries six lanes of traffic. A reasonable and prudent
motorist has a green light in his favor as he approaches that maze.
What must he do? Must he stop in order that he may survey what
is occurring in the other lanes of traffic? Allowing the motorist the benefit of Rule 2 enables him to continue his forward progress in reliance
upon the favorable signal. Of course, as previously stated, he may not
arbitrarily exercise his right.21 He must still exercise a degree of care
commensurate with the danger which continues to exist. 22 Even so, he
is merrily on his way while the motorist operating under Rule 1 is still
sitting at the intersection in a state of bewilderment.
Considering that traffic lights have two purposes, it seems that Rule 1
should be discarded. While it may have the effect of rendering crossings
less dangerous, 2 it does not facilitate the flow of traffic. Having determined that the autorratic traffic signal is green, the motorist must
take the same precautions he would have to take at an unguarded blind
intersection; therefore, under Rule 1, the green light is nothing more
" Messier v. Zanglis, 144 Conn. 449, 133 A.2d 619 (1957) ; Smith v. Sizemore,
300 S.W.2d 225 (Ky. 1957) ; Coyle v. Stopak, 165 Neb. 594, 86 N.W.2d 758 (1957) ;
Morgan v. Saunders, 236 N.C. 162, 72 S.E.2d 411 (1952); Henke v. Peyerl, 89
N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1958).
"1Cases cited note 14 supra.
22 Cappo v. Baker, 91 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 1957) ; Sullivan v. Locke, 73 So. 2d
616 (La. App. 1954); Stephens v. Koprowski, 295 Mich. 213, 294 N.W. 158
(1940) ; Witt v. Peterson, 310 S.W.2d 857 (Mo. 1958) ; Rynar v. Lincoln Transit
Co., 129 N.J.L. 525, 30 A.2d 406 (Ct. Err. & App. 1943) ; Dembicer v. Pawtucket
Cabinet & Builders Finish Co., 58 R.I. 451, 193 Atl. 622 (1937). See also Nelson

v. Ziegler, 89 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 1956); Politte v. Miller, 301 S.W.2d 839 (Mo.

App. 1957) ; Groome v. Davis, 215 N.C. 510, 2 SE.2d 771 (1939) ; Reid v. Abbiati,
113 Vt. 233, 32 A.2d 133 (1943).
3 But see Perpetua v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 380 Pa. 561, 565, 112 A.2d
337, 339 (1955) (dissenting opinion), where it was said: "A hesitating, demurring
and irresolute driver is by no means the safest of drivers. Vacillation can cause as
much chaos as impetuosity."
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than an additional factor to be noted. On the other hand, Rule 2, which
allows the motorist to proceed uninterruptedly into the intersection and
make his observation while in progress, operates effectively as to both
purposes. Crossings are rendered less dangerous and the flow of
traffic is facilitated.
WILLIAm H. HOLDFORD
Workmen's Compensation-Analysis of "Jurisdictional Fact"
Review by Superior Courts
The North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act empowers the
Industrial Commission to make findings of fact which are binding on the
parties and on courts on appeal. Appeals from rulings of the Commission may be taken only "for errors of law, under the same terms and
conditions as govern appeals in ordinary civil actions." 1
Cases in North Carolina reveal two lines of authority concerning
the extent to which findings by the Industrial Commission may be reviewed on appeal to the superior court. One group 2 of cases shows
literal adherence to the language of the act in holding that the courts
may review only questions of law. The other group 3 departs from the
literal language of the act and asserts that the superior court judge may
not only review questions of law, but that he may also make his own
findings of "jurisdictional fact" 4 upon motion of the appellant.
I N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§ 97-86 (1958) provides that the award of the Commission

"shall be conclusive and binding as'to all questions of fact; but either party to the

dispute may... appeal from the decision of said Commission to the superior court
... for errors of law, under the same terms and conditions as govern appeals in
ordinary
civil actions... ." (Emphasis added.)
2
Hawes v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 243 N.C. 62, 89 S.E.2d 739
(1955); Thomason v. Red Bird Cab Co., 235 N.C. 602, 70 S.E.2d 706 (1952);
Smith v. Southern Waste Paper Co., 226 N.C. 47, 36 S.E.2d 730 (1946) ; Hayes v.
Elon College, 224 N.C. 11, 29 S.E.2d 137 (1944) ; Bivens v. Teer, 220 N.C. 135,
16 S.E.2d 659 (1941); Beach v. McLean, 219 N.C. 521, 14 S.E.2d 515 (1941);
Birchfield v. Department of Conservation and Development, 204 N.C. 217, 167 S.E.
855 (1933).
Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc., 244 N.C. 84, 92 S.E.2d 673 (1956) ; Aylor v.
Barnes, 242 N.C. 223, 87 S.E.2d 269 (1955); Francis v. Carolina Wood Turning
Co., 204 N.C. 701, 169 S.E. 654 (1933) ; Aycock v. Cooper, 202 N.C. 500, 505, 163
S.E. 569, 571 (1932) (dictum).
'"[I]n every proceeding of a judicial nature, there are one or more facts which
are strictly jurisdictional, the existence of which is necessary to the validity of the
proceedings, and without which the act of the court is a mere nullity .... " Nobel v.
Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165, 173 (1893).
Professor Larson has said that practically every fact decided in compensation
cases has some bearing on the tribunal's jurisdiction and that reduced to the absurd,
the rule could be used to render the tribunal powerless to decide any question with
finality. 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 80.41 (1952).

The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, has termed only three issues
questions of "jurisdictional fact": (1). Was the injured worker an employee?
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(2) (1958); Francis v. Carolina: Wood Turning Co.,
stepra note 3; (2) Does the defendant regularly work five or more employees?
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13(b) (1958); Aycock v. Cooper, supra note 3; (3) If
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The existence of these two lines of authority raises several questions.
First, in what circumstances have the two approaches been used?
Second, is the "jurisdictional fact" doctrine necessary? Third, why
has the "jurisdictional fact" approach been used? It is the purpose of
this note to explore the questions presented by these two divergent views.
Aycock v. Cooper5 is the earliest reported case in which the Industrial
Commission's jurisdiction was challenged in a workmen's compensation
case. The superior court was upheld in reversing an award of the full
Commission because there was no competent evidence to support the
"jurisdictional fact" that there were five employees. In dictum6 the
court said that had there been competent evidence on this point, a
proper construction of G.S. § 97-86 would have justified a redetermination of this "jurisdictional fact" by the superior court. It was conceded
that all other facts are binding on appeal.
The Aycock dictum was followed in Francisv. CarolinaWood Turning Co. 7 where the superior court was upheld in making an independent
finding, from conflicting evidence, of the "jurisdictional fact" of employment and in setting aside the Commission's finding that plaintiff
8
was an independent contractor.
Until 1955 the Aycock and Francis decisions, although cited in
several dicta, 9 were not reaffirmed. For a time the court seemed to deal
with jurisdictional matters as questions of law only. An example of
this approach is found in Beach v. McLean.1° In that case the jurisdictional question was whether claimant was the employee of the appellant
or of an independent contractor who was not subject to the act. The
Commission's finding, from undisputed facts, that the appellant was
claimant's employer was reversed by the superior court. In affirming
the lower court's decision the court described the question of employment as a mixed one of law and fact. The contractual elements found
to exist by the Commission were conclusive fact findings, but the relationship evidenced by those facts was treated as a reviewable question of law.
the injury occurred out of the state, are the place the employment contract was

made, the place of business of the employer, and the residence of the employee all

in North Carolina? N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-36 (1958) ; Aylor v. Barnes, supra note
3.
The court has held that whether there was an injury resulting from an accident
arising out of and in the course of the employment is conclusive as found by the
Commission, if supported by competent evidence, and is not a reviewable "jurisdictional fact." Francis v. Carolina Wood Turning Co., supra.
6202 N.C. 500, 163 S.E. 569 (1932).

OId. at 505, 163 S.E. at 571.
7204 N.C. 701, 169 S.E. 654 (1933).
B See note 17 infra.
Mallard v. F. M. Bohannon, Inc., 220 N.C. 536, 542, 18 S.E.2d 189, 192 (1941);
Buchanan v. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 217 N.C. 173, 175, 7 S.E.2d
382, 383 (1940) ; Thompson v. Johnson Funeral Home, 208 N.C. 178, 180, 179 S.E.
801, 803 (1935).
10219 N.C. 521, 14 S.E.2d 515 (1941).
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In Smith v. Southern Waste Paper Co.,'" as in the Beach case,
there was no dispute as to the facts. The superior court reversed the
Commission's finding that claimant's deceased was an employee. The
supreme court reversed, calling such a jurisdictional issue a reviewable
question of law, but holding that where, as here, there is competent
evidence to support the findings and conclusion of the Commission the
award should be affirmed. This opinion seems to go further than any
other in the direction of a liberal attitude toward the finality of Commission decisions. Although this case apparently stands for the proposition that the Commission's conclusions of law will be upheld it
supported by competent evidence, the court in subsequent cases has no-,
so interpreted it. On the contrary, it has been accepted along with
Beach, a question of law case, as authoritative on the question of the
scope of the courts' review powers in cases where the jurisdiction of the
Commission was in issue. In Aylor v. Barnes,' 2 however, the court
reaffirmed the "jurisdictional fact" rule of the Aycock and Francis
cases. The lower court affirmed the Commission's assumption of jurisdiction and award to the claimant and rejected appellant's argument for
non-coverage based on allegations that claimant was a non-resident and
that the injury occurred outside the state. On appeal, the superior court
was reversed for failure to make an independent finding of the disputed
"jurisdictional fact" of residence.
In Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc., '3 plaintiff, in a hearing before the Industrial Commission, attacked that body's jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement into which he had entered with defendantemployer on the ground that he was not an employee. The superior
court, upon its independent finding of the disputed question of employment, affirmed the Commission's finding of no jurisdiction. The supreme
court approved, invoking the "jurisdictional fact" rule, even though
at times it labeled the employment question one of law. The case, however, was reversed on other grounds.
Shortly after the decision in the Hart case the fact that two lines of
authority exist with regard to jurisdictional review was recognized for
the first time by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in the case of
Pearson v. Peerless Flooring Co.' 4 Defendant had appealed from an
award to a worker's widow alleging that deceased was an independent
contractor and not an employee as found by the Commission. Defendant
assigned as error the failure of the judge below to make an independent
finding of this "jurisdictional fact." The supreme court found, however,
that such a finding had in fact been made. Since the superior court's
-1226 N.C. 47, 36 S.E.2d 730 (1946).
12242 N.C. 223, 87 S.E.2d 269 (1955).
.-3 244 N.C. 84, 92 S.E.2d 673 (1956).
,247 N.C. 434, 101 S.E.2d 301 (1958).
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finding was the same as that of the Commission, as was the case in the
Hart decision, the court did not have to adopt or reject either of the two
lines of authority. The court did call attention to the conflict and
noted that a considerable period followed the Aycock and Francis
decisions during which the "jurisdictional fact" doctrine of those cases
was not invoked. It was also pointed out by the court that when the
doctrine was again used in the Hart and Aylor decisions it was not
re-examined for its soundness.
An attempt to classify the situations in which the two approaches have
been used yields the following generalities. First, the "jurisdictional
fact" approach is taken where there is conflicting evidence as to basic
facts upon which the ultimate conclusion as to jurisdiction turns.
Second, the doctrine generally has gone unmentioned when there is no
dispute as to the evidentiary facts.
What difference, if any, exists between a finding of "jurisdictional
fact" and a legal conclusion regarding a circumstance on which a tribunal's jurisdiction depends? Where there is an agreed statement of facts
the only possible issues for judicial determination are questions of law. 1'
Likewise it seems that when a-tribunal has the power to find basic or
evidentiary facts conclusively, 16 that the ultimate or "jurisdictional fact"
of employment, number employed, or place of residence of the worker,
would be but a legal conclusion to be drawn from those facts.
Had the superior courts' power of review been expressly limited by
the supreme court to questions of law, all of the cases discussed could
have been decided as they were with the exception of the Francis
case. 17 The court has, on occasion, substantiated this assertion by
citing, without distinction, cases which adopt both views.' 8
Why has appellate court redetermination of "jurisdictional facts"
been permitted? Professor Larson has offered the following explanation: "The statute gives the administrative agency power to make
decisions with reference only to certain situations; an agency with
delegated powers may not enlarge those powers beyond the statutory
5Thomas

v. Raleigh Gas Co., 218 N.C. 429, 11 S.E.2d 297 (1940).

See note 1 supra.
'7 The Franciscase stands out as a decision that seems to be irreconcilable with
a "question of law" approach to review. The superior court judge was allowed to
redetermine, from the conflicting evidence in the record, evidentiary facts bearing
on the question of employment. The Commission called plaintiff, wh9 worked at
a table in defendant's shop, an independent contractor. The court sustained the
lower court's independent finding that he was an employee. Perhaps the court
in the Francis case stretched the "jurisdictional fact" rule to reach the result
they -felt justice demanded.
18 The Aylor and Hart decisions
("jurisdictional fact" cases) cite Smith v.
Southern Waste Paper Co. (a "question of law" case) as authority for the review
of "jurisdictional facts." The Smith case states that jurisdiction is reviewable as
a question of law and cites Aycock v. Cooper (the original "jurisdictional fact" case)
as authority for this proposition.
1
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grant by its own act; it therefore cannot be allowed to make conclusive
findings of the very facts on which the scope of its power and jurisdiction depends. Therefore the reviewing court must decide for itself
whether the facts on which jurisdiction rests actually existed." 19
In the dictum of Aycock v. Cooper it was stated that both a "proper
construction" of the statute20 and "well-settled principles of law" require a redetermination of the "jurisdictional facts" by the superior
court on appeal. The court did not explain the construction or the
principles upon which it relied in asserting the requirement of such
2
review. 1

It might be argued that the statutory wording, "under the same terms
and conditions as govern appeals in ordinary civil actions," justifies a
holding that "jurisdictional facts" are reviewable. The quoted words
have been held to make appeals from the Commission analogous to those
from justices of the peace. 22 The superior court has appellate jurisdic23
tion of all issues of law or fact determined by a justice of the peace.
The court later limited the justice of the peace analogy to the mechanics
of appeal, i.e., procedures for docketing and notice of appeal. 24 This
holding seems to preclude justification of "jurisdictional fact" reviewof the type seen in the Franciscase-on the basis of this analogy.
In ordinary civil actions beginning in the superior court where the
judge has found a "jurisdictional fact," such as domicile, his determination will be held conclusive on appeal if there is any competent evidence
to support the finding. 25 This is true regardless of the conclusion that
26
It
the supreme court might have reached upon the same evidence.
seems that the court has attached less significance to the findings of
"jurisdictional fact" by the Industrial Commission.
Perhaps the "jurisdictional fact" doctrine sprang from a desire on the
part of the court to vest in the judiciary a greater amount of control
over the scope and coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
This control would naturally be exercised by reversals of the Commission's finding or non-finding of "jurisdictional facts." Yet in only
one case 27 has the supreme court upheld a superior court reversal of
the Commission by invoking the "jurisdictional fact" doctrine.

112 LARsoN,

op. cit. supra note 4.
See note 1 supra.
2 Connor, J., speaking for the court, expressed the opinion that a failure to
recognize the review power over "jurisdictional facts" might raise a serious constitutional question as to the validity of the statute that is now G.S. § 97-86. 202
N.C. at 505, 163 S.E. at 571.
Higdon v. Nantahala Power and Light Co., 207 N.C. 39, 175 S.E. 710 (1934)..
' 3 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7-66 (1953).
2 Fox v. Cramerton Mills, Inc., 225 N.C. 580, 35 S.E.2d 869 (1945).
:'Bangle v. Webb, 220 N.C. 423, 17 S.E.2d 613 (1941).
8Ibid.
27 See note 17 supra.
20
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Although the "jurisdictional fact" rule if greatly extended would tend
to deprive the Commission of its ability to perform its duty effectively
28
and reduce its proceedings to "meaningless preliminary skirmishes,1
the rule has not, as yet, reduced the effectiveness of the Commission in
settling compensation claims in North Carolina. The rule has, however,
given rise to confusion in federal compensation cases and has been the
topic of several well-reasoned dissenting opinions. 29 In addition, a
recent treatise on workmen's compensation states that the rule has
been "largely discredited."30
Another objectionable feature of the rule that "jurisdictional facts"
are excepted from the binding facts found by the Commission is that
the superior court, without seeing any witnesses or hearing any testimony, may go into the record and determine for itself not just the
"jurisdictional fact" but also the basic facts which, considered together,
afford a basis for determination of the "jurisdictional fact."3'
This
practice seems not to be justified by G.S. § 97-86.
The return of the "jurisdictional fact" rule in the Aylor and Hart
cases could indicate a desire on the part of the court to revest in the
judiciary a measure of control seemingly disclaimed in the Beach and
Smith cases. A more likely reason for the return of the rule is that
mentioned in the Pearson case, namely, that the court apparently apLARSON, op. cit. supra note 4.
" In Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), the United States Supreme Court
held that administrative findings of fact as to the employment relationship and the
location of the accident were "jurisdictional facts" which could be determined anew
upon appeal to the district court under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act. Speaking for a three-justice minority, Mr. Justice Brandeis
criticized the majority opinion by saying: "Whatever may be the propriety of a
rule permitting special re-examination in a trial court of so-called 'jurisdictional
facts' passed upon by administrative bodies having otherwise final jurisdiction over
matters properly committed to them, I find no warrant for extending the doctrine
to other and different administrative tribunals whose very function is to hear
evidence and make initial determinations concerning those matters which it is sought
to re-examine ....
Logically applied it would seriously impair the entire administrative process." Id. at 92, 93. In this case the review provisions of the compensation act in question were similar to those of G.S. § 97-86. See note 1 supra.
In Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946), where appellant sought to have
a judicial redetermination of "jurisdictional facts" foujid by a draft board, in his
concurring opinion Mr. Justice Frankfurter said: "This argument revives, if
indeed it does not multiply, all the casuistic difficulties spawned by the doctrine
of 'jurisdictional fact.' In view of the criticism which that doctrine, as sponsored
by Crowell v. Benson,.. . brought forth and of the attritions of that case through
later decisions, one had supposed that the doctrine had earned a deserved repose."
Id. at 142.
Although the "jurisdictional fact" doctrine has been widely criticized both by
members of the United States Supreme Court and legal writers, and later decisions
have failed to extend the rule of the Crowell case even to similar situations, it has
never been specifically overruled. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS, 133
(1938). See Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 288 U.S. 162 (1933); Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's dissenting opinion, Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685, 695
(1944); Pittsburgh S.S. Co. v. Brown, 81 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. Ill. 1947).
202 LARSON, Op. cit. supra note 4.
"See note 17 supra.
282
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plied the rule of the Aycock and Francis cases without a reappraisal of
its soundness.
When a proper case comes before the court, the suggested reappraisal
should be made and the "jurisdictional fact" rule should be abandoned
in North Carolina. This abandonment is suggested not because the rule
has led to abuse by the courts, but in the interest of lending consistency
to legal terminology. There appears to be little need for perpetuating
two phrases to express the same idea and to accomplish the same legal
purpose. If the motivation for adopting the rule was the desire to
exercise greater control over the policy of the act, past experience does
not show that it has been necessary. If no such motive was present, then
there is no apparent need for using the two phrases interchangeably.
It is felt that abandonment of the term "jurisdictional fact" would not
require the court to relinquish any control over compensation policy
which it may have exercised in the past; and certainly, such a course
would lend greater clarity to this area of the law.
ROBERT L. LINDSEY

